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Abstract: The economic literature on the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) establishes 
empirical evidence for culturally-biased voting, more precisely also biases based on 
geographical closeness, political relations, ethnical and linguistic affinity. The Bun-
desvision Song Contest (BSC), a similar contest with principally the same rules but 
organized on the national level in Germany, offers a unique opportunity to com-
pare international voting bias patterns to national voting bias patterns. Thus, this 
paper presents an innovative analysis by comparatively analyzing the ESC´s histori-
cal data from 1998 to 2013 and the BSC´s data from its beginning in 2005 until 
2013 with the same econometric methodology. Our results show that voting biases 
do not only matter in international contests but also occur in similarly-organized 
national contests with roughly similar magnitude and quality – despite the cultural 
background of participants and voters being much more homogenous. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
During the past decade, several papers have econometrically analyzed voting be-
havior in the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC), one of the most successful and long-
est-running international music competitions and television shows worldwide. 
Since inhabitants of the participating countries (in varying combinations of expert 
juries and audience voting) vote for the acts that each represent a participating 
country, allegations of political bloc-voting as well as cultural biases in the voting 
patterns frequently surfaced in the public discussion. While the most recent and 
arguably most sophisticated analyses empirically confirmed voting biases, they at-
tributed the voting bias more to cultural-linguistic similarities between countries 
and geographical proximity than to political factors. So, it is basically the interna-
tional, cross-cultural character of the song contest that is viewed to create and fuel 
voting biases. Our paper contributes to this discussion by taking advantage of 
some kind of a unique natural experiment that has been undertaken in German TV. 
The commercial TV broadcasting company ProSiebenSat.1 introduced a copy of the 
ESC on the national level in Germany in 2005, the so-called Bundesvision Song Con-
test (BSC). It is held annually and follows virtually the same rules as the ESC with 
the 16 German states replacing the European nations of the ESC. Thus, we have a 
contest that very closely resembles the ESC but with much more homogeneous par-
ticipants in terms of cultural and linguistic traits. Consequently, the interesting re-
search questions are (i) whether culturally-biased voting does occur in a national 
contest and (ii) how the biased voting patterns compare to those of the ESC. In our 
analysis, we find empirical evidence for the existence of voting bias in the national 
contest (BSC). Furthermore, a large set of independent variables display very similar 
influences on the voting patterns in both contests. Generally, bias favoring neigh-
boring countries occurs less frequent in the national contest (BSC) than in the in-
ternational contest (ESC) but only to a limited extent. Furthermore, the BSC-specific 
phenomenon of patriotic voting implies that overall geographic bias in the national 
contest is not necessarily smaller than in the international context. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews several earlier studies 
focusing on voting bias in the Eurovision Song Contest. Section 3 determines back-
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ground and rules of both the Eurovision and the Bundesvision song contest. Sec-
tion 4 forms the main part, containing a description of our (panel) data model, the 
econometric analysis and the diverse variables that possibly affect the voting bias. 
Section 5 discusses the estimation results before section 6 concludes. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
One of the first papers on the Eurovision Song Contest is Kressly and Konrad (1978) 
describing background and general information about the Eurovision Song Con-
test. Yair (1995) provides pioneering work with an exploratory study, analyzing vot-
ing behavior in the period 1975-1992 with multidimensional social network pro-
gramming and finding a three-bloc political structure consisting of the Western, 
the Northern and the Mediterranean Bloc. Because his study focuses on the average 
number of points each participating country gives another over the time-period, 
Yair and Maman (1996) extend the study by using yearly voting patterns between 
the blocs and show hegemony of Western Bloc nations receiving the highest 
points. Gatherer (2004) identifies statistically significant voting partnerships (”the 
Viking Empire”, the “Warsaw Pact”, and two smaller blocs) by analyzing and simu-
lating the period between 1975 and 2002. 
Fenn et al. (2006) use a dynamic network approach to investigate collusive voting 
behavior in the ESC throughout the period of 1992-2003 and invalidate the as-
sumption of a contest with random behavior. By using cluster analysis they reveal 
nonlinear patterns and infer the existence of informal cliques of participating coun-
tries. Because of some unexpected “voting cliques” (or the lack of it, e.g. no corre-
lation between Cyprus and Turkey), the authors conclude that similarities in voting 
behavior cannot be explained exclusively by geographical proximity. Instead, fur-
ther explanations such as cultural and historical closeness need to be considered. 
Gatherer (2006) extends this line of research by analyzing collusive voting behavior 
as a process of development, resulting in the emergence of large geographical 
blocs since the mid-90s. 
Somewhat in parallel to this line of research, several authors scrutinize specific al-
ternative explanations for voting results, such as the role of performance order (Re-
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nato and Ginsburgh 1996; Bruine de Bruin 2005) and differences in voting behav-
ior between public voting (via televoting) and expert voting (by juries) (Glejser and 
Heyndels 2001; Haan et al. 2005). For the years 1956-1997, Haan et al. (2005) find 
that the order of appearance has a systematic influence on the final points in the 
Eurovision Song Contest, however, this effect is less pronounced with expert juries 
than with public juries. Furthermore, others deal with the mere-exposure effect 
(Verrier 2012), the role of news factors (Schweiger and Brosius 2003), the role of 
Turkish emigrants (Christensen and Christensen 2008), and the relevance of stereo-
types (Georgiou 2008).1  
The literature that is closest to our research is triggered by Fenn et al. (2006). Moti-
vated by their negligence of relevant factors influencing voting bias, it significantly 
extends the set of variables taking into account as possible driving forces for biased 
(or non-biased) voting. For instance, Ginsburgh and Noury (2008) present an exten-
sive and very detailed econometric analysis for explaining the voting behavior par-
ticularly with regard to the importance of the song´s quality. The idea behind their 
study is to show “what may look as vote trading is in fact sincere voting based on 
‘quality’, and linguistic and cultural proximities” (Ginsburgh and Noury 2008). 
Therefore, they distinguish between strategic and cultural voting. While the former 
describes two countries exchanging votes in the contest, the latter implies that 
countries’ citizens prefer songs from certain countries based on linguistic and cul-
tural closeness. Against this background, they compose a model for explaining the 
given numbers of points as well as certain other variables. These variables charac-
terize linguistic differences (based on the lexicostatistical distances derived by Dyen 
et al. 1992), performance characteristics (such as gender of the lead singer, if the 
song is performed in a group, alone or in a duet, order of performance, where the 
contest is performed and whether a participant comes from that host country, 
sung language, etc.), and cultural distances based on Hofstede’s (1980, 1991) cul-
tural dimensions. For the period 1975-2003, Ginsburgh and Noury (2008) test the 
hypothesis of exchanging the votes in the contest and estimate it by linear as well 
1 For reasons of completeness, there are also studies analyzing the ESC with special focus put on: 
ESC used as a lever for economic growth (Fleischer et al. 2002), the ESC as a proxy variable for 
explaining European trade (Kokko and Tingvall 2012) or in terms of pure simulations (Baker 
2008, García and Tanase 2013). 
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as non-linear methods. They show that the significance of vote trading is on the 
one hand only significant in some specifications of their model and on the other 
hand its impact is very small. However, the quality and the language of the per-
formed song are significant and play an essential role in explaining voting behavior. 
Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009; see also Clerides and Stengos 2006) present a simi-
lar study but in contrast to the study of Ginsburgh and Noury (2008) and Haan et 
al. (2005), they assume that voting bias towards some songs may deviate signifi-
cantly among the participants. They also introduce a range of variables to differen-
tiate voting based on political issues from preferences based on cultural, linguistic, 
ethnic, and religious closeness. Their results show that a lot of countries still prefer 
songs of countries nearby even after correcting for linguistic and cultural aspects. 
Their study uncovers factors that substantially bias the votes based on cultural, lin-
guistic, geographical, religious, and ethnical factors. However, religious and patri-
otic voting grew noticeably stronger since the change to the new voting system in 
1997/1998 (Spierdijk and Vellekoop 2009). Although Spierdijk and Vellekoop 
(2009) find significance for geographical and therefore suggested political (= tacti-
cal voting) influence they do not find support for the publicly debated accusations 
of political voting against certain countries.  
Interestingly, there is no research on the role of (culturally-bias) audience voting in 
national contests. Against this background, this paper aims to contribute to the 
existing literature by analyzing voting patterns and collusive behavior in national 
contests. Our study offers a unique opportunity to identify the drivers for audience 
voting behavior more closely by analyzing voting bias of the Bundesvision Song 
Contest (BSC), a similar contest organized on the national level in Germany, as well 
and compare it to the ESC.  
3 THE CONTESTS: BACKGROUND AND RULES 
3.1 EUROVISION SONG CONTEST (ESC) 
The ESC is one of the longest-running and favorite annual music competitions and 
television shows worldwide. In 1955, the director of the European Broadcasting 
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Union (EBU), Marcel Bezençon, came up with the idea of an international song con-
test broadcasted on television. The EBU was founded by 23 broadcasting estab-
lishments from Europe and the Mediterranean at a conference in United Kingdom 
in 1950 with the purpose to build a network to exchange news films. Nowadays, it 
is the world's leading union of public service media organizations consisting of 56 
Members of states both within Europe and beyond its borders. The EBU operates 
inter alia EUROVISION that is not only the producer and distributer of live news and 
sports but also of music and cultural contents.2 The first Grand Prix Eurovision took 
place in Lugano on the 24th of May, 1956, with seven nations participating and 
being supported by their corresponding public broadcasters.3 The main aim of the 
contest is to “promote high-quality original songs in the field of popular music, by 
encouraging competition among artists, songwriters and composers through the 
international comparison of their songs” (EBU/UER 2013). The ESC is broadcast 
throughout Europe as well as in non-participating countries like Canada, Hong 
Kong, New Zealand, Korea and the United States.4 
All active Members of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) are invited to take 
part in the ESC. Membership is not restricted to European countries, for instance, 
Morocco and Israel participated in the contest in the past. The major investors 
(Germany, France, Great Britain, Spain and Italy) and the winner of the previous 
contest are granted guaranteed participation in the final of the contest. The other 
finalist positions are awarded to the ten best participants of the semifinals. In the 
end, all participating countries vote, even if they are not qualified for the final. The 
performance order used to be chosen randomly. However, since 2013 the produc-
ers of the show determine the order of performance based on dramaturgical as-
pects.  
In the past years, the details of the voting system and the number of participating 
countries were frequently modified. The current system of scoring, introduced in 
1975, is based upon every country creating its own ranking of the top 10 perfor-
mances. The participant who obtains the highest number of votes within a country, 
2 See http://www3.ebu.ch/cms/en/about?jsite=c49010fa-a809-4b28-a2c8-7363e32879c5. 
3  For comparison, there were 39 participating countries in Malmö last year. 
4 See http://www.eurovision.tv/page/history/the-story. 
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receives twelve points, the second place will be rewarded with ten and the third 
place with eight points. The performers of the seven following ranks receive de-
creasingly seven to one point. Nine and eleven points are not awarded. An essential 
modification was the introduction of a televoting system in 1997 partially and 1998 
fully. From now on audience votes (via telephone calls and text messages (SMS)) 
also decide upon the winning country and therefore influence the final results. Af-
ter some fine tuning, the final points allocation of each country is nowadays com-
piled half-and-half by votes of the public audience and an expert jury. The jury of 
experts consists of five experts in each partaking country. They have to be nationals 
of the country they represent as well as professionally in connection with the music 
industry. At the same time, they are not allowed to have a business relationship 
with the candidate of their own country or of any other country. Both expert juries 
and the audience of the participating countries are not allowed to vote for their 
own country. After the last performance, televoting is opened for the public audi-
ence. The winner of the contest is the country with the highest number of points. 
Another important change was the introduction of two semi-finals in 2004 in order 
to accommodate more participants. Participating countries have to compete in a 
qualifying round for the purpose of reaching the contest´s final. All qualified coun-
tries vote in the final, but, of course, only countries participating in the final contest 
receive votes. This led to an increase of the total number of contestants from 24 in 
2003 to 36 in 2004. While the participants had to sing their song in their country’s 
official national language(s) from 1966-1972 and again from 1978-1998, countries 
are free to choose to the present day. Groups of musicians (‘bands’) are not al-
lowed to exceed the number of six people. Texts, speeches and gestures of a politi-
cal nature are prohibited during the contest.5 
  
5 See http://www.eurovision.de/event/regeln/Die-Regeln-des-ESC,regeln103.html for the whole 
chapter. 
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3.2 BUNDESVISION SONG CONTEST (BSC) 
The BSC is a German music competition based on the role-model of the ESC.6 The 
first BSC was held on 12 February 2005 in Oberhausen. The contest was launched 
by entertainer Stefan Raab, who took the Eurovision Song Contest as an inspira-
tion. He had participated in the ESC as an artist in 2000, scoring fifth place, as well 
as several times as a producer. Notably, the winner of the 2010 ESC, Lena Meyer-
Landrut, was selected through a casting process in Raab’s TV-Show “Unser Star für 
Oslo”. 
All in all, the BSC rules mirror the ESC rules very closely. All 16 states of Germany 
take part in the BSC. In the end, the audiences in all participating countries vote for 
their favorite country. As in ESC, the German state winning the contest hosts the 
next BSC. The winner of the contest is determined by telephone calls and SMS vot-
ing by public audience. However, in contrast to the ESC, it is also possible to vote 
for one´s own country and there is no expert jury. The points system is the same: 
the participant, who obtains the highest number of votes within a country, receives 
twelve points, the second place will be rewarded with ten and the third place with 
eight points. The performers of the seven following ranks receive seven to one 
point. Likewise, nine and eleven points are not awarded. The language of the song 
is free to choose with the exception of the rule that at least 50% of the text must 
be sung in German. After the last performance, the lines for the public voting are 
opened for the audience voters via telephone and SMS. Expectedly, the winner of 
the contest is the country with the highest number of points.7 
3.3 RELEVANCE OF RULE DIFFERENCES 
While the BSC represents an almost perfect copy of the ESC and, thus, offers a 
near-to-perfect opportunity for comparisons of voting pattern biases in an interna-
tional versus a national context, the existing differences in the rules may not be 
completely irrelevant. This predominantly refers to the rule that in the ESC, voters 
6 The name is a combination of the prefix "Bundes" from Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal 
Republic of Germany) and the Eurovision Song Contest. 
7 See http://tvtotal.prosieben.de/tvtotal/specials/bundesvision-song-contest/. 
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must not vote for their own country, whereas in the BSC, voters are allowed to vote 
for their own country. 
This may have an influence on the results due to patriotic voting. Therefore, we 
control for patriotic voting by introducing a dummy variable for “home bias vot-
ing”. Furthermore, in an additional version, we also re-constructed the points allo-
cation of the BSC, excluding own-state votes. Note, however, that this correction is 
not perfect as we cannot know what the patriotic voters might have voted for if 
they were not allowed to vote for their own state. If voting for neighboring states 
is viewed to be an extension of patriotic voting (in terms of voting motivation), 
then this may lead to an underestimation of geographical voting bias in the case of 
the BSC. Since the additional version with the re-allocated points did not yield sig-
nificantly different results from our original model, we omit its results further on.  
A second important difference is the non-existence of expert juries with voting 
power in the BSC: while expert juries have enjoyed varying degrees of voting power 
(currently: 50 per cent of the votes) in the ESC, all votes in the BSC come from the 
audience. In the literature, it is usually believed that a higher share of audience vot-
ing increases voting biases (Haan et al. 2005). To that extent, our analysis may 
overestimate voting bias when comparing the BSC results to the ESC results.  
We do not think that other minor differences in the rules exert any influence on our 
results. 
4 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSES 
4.1 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In our paper, we perform a comparative empirical study, tracing and comparing 
voting patterns and biases in the ESC and the BSC. We use a complete historical 
voting data set of the ESC from 1998-20138 and collect the BSC voting data from 
its beginning in 2005-2013 9. The voting results are all published by an official 
committee of the host country every year, in which the contests take place. These 
8 See http://www.eurovision.tv; http://www.kolumbus.fi/jarpen/.  
9  See http://tvtotal.prosieben.de/tvtotal/specials/bundesvision-song-contest/. 
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voting results show the number of points each participating country or German 
state awarded every partaker in the contest. We use the years 1998-2013 (inclusive) 
for our data analysis regarding the ESC because there are hardly any changes in 
rules except the semi-final introduction. 
In each ESC, 23-26 countries participate in the final competition, in each BSC, (the 
same) 16 German states compete. For the ESC, countries that participated less than 
three times are not taken into consideration. In total we get 13119 observations for 
the ESC and 2304 observations for the BSC. We tabulated, inter alia, the points giv-
en from each country A to each other country B for every single year. All participat-
ing countries of the final ESC are listed in Table 1. Here you can find the number of 
times each country participated (Year), their total number of received votes (obser-
vations) and the mean points assigned per country over all partaking years. Azer-
baijan, for example, receives the highest number of points (4.495) on average from 
all voting countries over a period of 6 year. 
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Participating 
Countries (Final) 
  Years Obs. Mean Points Awarded 
Albania 6 235 1.970 
Armenia 6 237 3.122 
Austria 6 170 1.758 
Azerbaijan 6 242 4.495 
Belarus 3 117 1.803 
Belgium 8 228 2.548 
Bosnia and Herze. 13 447 2.521 
Croatia 11 332 2.240 
Cyprus 9 269 1.69 
Denmark 12 407 3.243 
Estonia 10 301 2.853 
Finland 9 311 1.723 
France 16 532 1.343 
Georgia 5 201 2.383 
Germany 16 532 2.208 
Greece 14 487 3.626 
Hungary 6 224 1.72 
Iceland 11 369 2.081 
Ireland 12 388 1.373 
Israel 11 335 2.259 
Italy 3 121 3.438 
Latvia 8 251 2.601 
Lithuania 9 307 1.38 
Macedonia 8 262 1.408 
Malta 12 369 2.495 
Moldova 8 316 1.974 
Netherlands 7 189 2.365 
Norway 13 426 2.969 
Poland 6 170 1.047 
Portugal 7 214 1.154 
Romania 14 488 2.190 
Russia 14 486 4.018 
Serbia 5 204 3.916 
Slovenia 7 199 1.703 
Spain 16 532 1.419 
Sweden 15 494 3.447 
Switzerland 6 187 1.101 
Turkey 14 452 3.276 
Ukraine 11 418 3.760 
Ukraine 16 532 1.5 
Table 1 Participating countries, years, observations and mean points awarded 
 
  
11 
 
The BSC displays always the same structure. Every German state participated at 
least nine times. Thus, there are 144 observations per German state.  
In order to get a first impression on voting biases, we look at the mean number of 
given points between dissimilar countries and (dis)similar federal states. According 
to the rules each participating country has to distribute a total of 58 points (58 = 
12 + 10 + 8 + 7 + 6 + 5 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1) and, under the assumption that the 
songs quality is equal for all countries (we will qualify this assumption in the analyt-
ical part), each country obtains expectably on average 58/(N - 1) points per partici-
pant with N participants in the ESC and 58/N in the BSC. In our sample the median 
contest size is 25 for the Eurovision and 16 for the BSC. Assuming the randomness 
of the songs quality, we assume that each country will obtain from each other 
58/24 = 2.42 points in the ESC and 58/16 = 3.625 in the BSC. With our purpose to 
compare, we determine the mean number of awarded points between every partic-
ipating countryA and countryB. In tables 2-4 we illustrate these country pairs regard-
ing the BSC and the ESC. Column -A to B- shows the mean number of points given 
from country A to country B throughout all years while column -All to B- presents 
the mean number of points given by all other participating states or countries 
throughout all years (except country A). As we can see, because German states are 
allowed to vote for themselves, they systematically award themselves more than 
the 3.625 points we assumed as an average.  
  
12 
 
 
 
Country A Country B A to B All to B 
(exc.A) 
,,Overvaluation“ 
A to B 
Bavaria Bavaria 11.8 1.6 10.2 
Saarland Saarland 11.8 1.6 10.2 
Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania 
Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania 
11.6 1.6 10.0 
Rhineland-Palatinate Rhineland-Palatinate 10.9 1.0 9.9 
Bremen Bremen 12.0 2.5 9.5 
Saxony-Anhalt Saxony-Anhalt 10.3 2.0 9.3 
Hesse Hesse 11.3 3.0 8.3 
Thuringia Thuringia 12.0 3.8 8.2 
Saxony Saxony 11.3 3.1 8.2 
Hamburg Hamburg 12.0 3.8 8.2 
Baden-Wuerttemberg Baden-Wuerttemberg 11.8 4.0 7.8 
Brandenburg Brandenburg 10.4 2.9 7.5 
Schleswig-Holstein Schleswig-Holstein 10.8 3.6 7.1 
North Rhine-Westphalia North Rhine-Westphalia 10.1 3.7 6.4 
Lower Saxony Lower Saxony 10.9 4.9 5.9 
Berlin Berlin 11.3 6.6 4.7 
Table 2 Country pairs vote’s for each other in the BSC (1) 
 
Country A Country B A to B B to A All to B  
(exc. A) 
,,Overvaluation“ 
          A to B 
Country B is favored by Country A 
Schleswig-Holstein Hamburg 8.0 7.1 4.1                        3.9 
Lower Saxony Bremen 6.6 6.0 2.8                        3.7 
Hamburg Schleswig-Holstein 7.1 8.0 3.9                       3.2 
Brandenburg Berlin 9.2 5.2 6.8                       2.5 
Saarland Rhineland-Palatinate 3.8 2.6 1.5                        2.3 
Baden-Wuerttemberg Rhineland-Palatinate 3.8 5.9 1.7                        2.1 
Berlin Brandenburg 5.2 9.2 3.2                       2.0 
Bavaria Rhineland-Palatinate 3.7 1.3 1.7                        2.0 
Saxony Thuringia 5.8 4.1 4.2                       1.6 
Rhineland-Palatinate Hesse 5.0 1.7 3.5                       1.5 
Country B is not favored by Country A 
Saxony Hamburg 2.6 2.1 4.4 -1.9 
Bremen Brandenburg 1.6 1.8 3.5 -1.9 
Saxony-Anhalt Bremen 1.2 1.1 3.2 -2.0 
Rhineland-Palatinate Thuringia 2.4 0.9 4.4 -2.0 
Thüringen Hamburg 2.4 3.9 4.5 -2.0 
Hamburg Berlin 5.0 3.8 7.0 -2.0 
Bavaria Saxony 1.4 1.9 3.5 -2.1 
Saxony-Anhalt Hamburg 2.1 2.1 4.5 -2.3 
Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania 
Bavaria 0.9 0.9 3.4 -2.5 
Lower Saxony Thuringia 1.9 4.7 4.5 -2.6 
Table 3 Country pairs vote’s for each other in the BSC, “top 10” (2) 
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While the upper part of table 3 shows the top 10 German states favor another 
German state, the lower part illustrates those 10, who awarded points lower than 
average. It is remarkable that East-German states and West-German states appear 
to favor each other against their political-historical backgrounds of the countries’ 
separation into East and West. 
The systematic biased voting in ESC is particularly obvious when looking at the 
‘friendship’ between Cyprus and Greece (table 4). While each country gave 1.689 
points on average10, which are 0.731 points less than the supposed average num-
ber of points (= 2.42), Greece gave an average of 12 points (the maximal number 
of points) to Cyprus throughout all the 7 years in our sample. The difference be-
tween 12 points and 1.689 shows the ‘overvaluation’ as a possible bias 
(,,Overvaluation“ A to B = 10.311). Similarly, Greece received an average of 12.00 
points from Cyprus, these are 8.98 points more than the average account for all 
years. While the first part of table 4 shows the participating countries not favoring 
another country, the second part lists those who awarded more points than the 
average.11 Thus, in addition to the absolute comparison between country pairs, also 
relative comparisons have to be taken into account. 
CountryA Obs
. 
Country 
B: is not 
favored 
by Coun-
try A 
,,Under- val-
uation“ 
A to B 
Yea
r 
Country B:  
is favored 
by Country 
A 
,,Over-
valua-
tion“ 
A to B 
Yea
r 
Albania 242 Armenia -
2.84
3 
6 Greece 6.863 10 
Andorra 146 Turkey -3.255 6 Spain 9.133 6 
Armenia 168 Azerbaijan -4.565 5 Georgia 7.143 5 
Austria 240 Ukraine -2.602 7 Bosnia 
Herz. 
6.715 8 
Azerbaijan 146 Italy -3.172 3 Turkey 8.501 4 
Belarus 245 Turkey -2.561 8 Russia 6.778 10 
Belgium 362 Ukraine -2.410 11 Nether-
lands 
7.215 6 
Bosnia Herz. 305 Denmark -2.736 10 Serbia 7.488 5 
Bulgaria 223 Italy -3.513 3 Greece 5.481 9 
Croatia 382 Armenia -3.184 6 Bosnia 7.614 13 
10 To save space we omitted some data on the voting patterns, i.e. the average number of points 
awarded for all countries. Those are available from the authors upon request. 
11 We note the country pairs with the most pronounced “undervaluation” and “overvaluation”. 
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Herz. 
Cyprus 361 Turkey -2.356 13 Greece 8.980 13 
Czech Re-
public 
74 Turkey -3.614 3 Armenia 8.081 3 
Denmark 330 Armenia -3.184 6 Sweden 5.998 13 
Estonia 383 Serbia -3.994 5 Latvia 5.745 8 
Finland 312 Armenia -3.013 6 Estonia 6.907 7 
France 377 Ukraine -3.064 11 Portugal 8.234 7 
Georgia 146 Serbia -2.764 5 Armenia 7.978 4 
Germany 377 Azerbaijan -3.771 6 Turkey 6.749 14 
Greece 332 Sweden -2.363 13 Cyprus 10.311 7 
Hungary 194 Bosnia 
Herz. 
-2.424 6 Iceland 4.172 5 
Iceland 333 Turkey -2.521 12 Denmark 6.467 11 
Ireland 357 Azerbaijan -3.599 6 Lithuania 4.937 8 
Israel 382 Serbia -3.380 5 Romania 3.361 14 
Italy 74 Sweden -5.163 3 Romania 5.029 3 
Latvia 337 Serbia -3.380 5 Estonia 5.133 8 
Lithuania 309 Armenia -2.842 6 Georgia 7.603 5 
Macedonia 313 Armenia -2.158 6 Albania 9.424 6 
Malta 381 Armenia -3.013 5 Italy 6.057 3 
Moldava 216 Turkey -3.325 7 Azerbaijan 4.432 6 
Monaco 72 Russia -3.467 3 France 4.608 3 
Montenegro 126 Ukraine -2.923 5 Serbia 6.980 3 
Netherlands 362 Russia -3.329 13 Turkey 5.360 13 
Norway 356 Armenia -3.184 6 Iceland 5.051 11 
Poland 287 Turkey -2.538 11 Ukraine 4.964 9 
Portugal 312 Armenia -2.779 5 Spain 6.361 13 
Romania 333 Latvia -2.955 7 Moldava 10.043 8 
Russia 331 Italy -3.513 3 Armenia 5.879 6 
San Marino 102 Ukraine -4.224 4 Greece 4.715 4 
Serbia 171 Turkey -3.241 5 Bosnia 
Herz. 
8.125 6 
Serbia & 
Mont. 
70 Turkey -2.897 3 Macedonia 7.8070 3 
Slovakia 125 Turkey -3.233 4 Estonia 5.509 4 
Slovenia 362 Armenia -2.331 6 Serbia 7.076 5 
Spain 377 Serbia -2.971 5 Romania 5.701 14 
Sweden 378 Italy -3.513 3 Finland 5.623 9 
Switzerland 315 Russia -3.952 12 Albania 6.685 6 
Turkey 353 Serbia -3.994 5 Armenia 5.427 5 
Ukraine 263 Serbia -2.354 5 Belarus 6.405 3 
UK 377 Serbia -3.994 5 Ireland 5.735 12 
Table 4 shows all participating countries A and their given points in average to 
country B, the number of observations and years, in which countries participated; 
country pairs with min and max average bias as in Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009). 
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4.2 METHOD 
Our goal is to explain possible biased votes in the ESC and BSC through our (panel) 
data model. Our (panel) data set consists of three dimensions, which are year = 
time (t), juries = country (A) and the performed song of another country (B). Be-
cause not every country takes part every year in the ESC, our data set is unbalanced 
and because every German state takes part in the BSC, this data set is balanced. As 
Lazarsfeld et al. (1948: 137) conclude in their study that “voting is essentially a 
group experience. People who work or live or play together are likely to vote for the 
same candidates", we assume homogenous behavior of voting across participating 
countries and states of Germany. We follow the outstanding idea of Spierdijk and 
Vellekoop (2009) and also analyze the voting behavior separately for each country 
instead of looking at the average influence of independent variables on the de-
pendent variable -votes-, where the average is calculated over all voting countries. 
We choose this method because the aim of our study is to discuss if voting bias 
occurs in the BSC also and if it differs from the voting bias in the ESC. Because the 
participating German States in the BSC correspond to the participating countries in 
the ESC the country-specific by has the advantage of capturing voting patterns 
more precisely. 
Inter alia, Clerides and Stengos (2006) define the dependent variable as the number 
of points awarded by country A to country B. Because it is hard to measure to 
measure any ‘true’ or ‘pure’ quality of a song (like with any other artistic creation), 
they subdivided the “perceived quality” into ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ quality el-
ements. While the former describes observable characteristics of a song such as 
gender, group/solo performance or the song’s language, the latter relies on intrin-
sic individual preferences of the voters for a special type of song. Clerides and 
Stengos (2006) choose to concentrate only on the objective attributes of quality 
that might exert an influence to the perceived song’s quality (constructed as “pack-
aging effects”). Consequently, they consider only some of the quality elements. 
However, a high number of given points from one country to another country 
could be a response to a perceived (‘subjective’) high song quality. Indeed, it is al-
ways questionable and difficult to measure quality of artistic performance because 
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it is simply often unobservable. However, Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009: 410) pro-
pose a very interesting proxy for “quality”12 of the performed song: ´𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞´𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,−𝐴𝐴 =  1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘 ≠𝐴𝐴   (1) 
 
𝑏𝑏𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 − ´𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞´𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,−𝐴𝐴 ,  (2) 
 
 
𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡  =  number of all participating countries without country A and country B 
in year t 
𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 =  awarded points of country A to country B’s song in year t, stAB=0, if 
country A  or B does not vote in year t 
 
Thus, we define the bias expressed by equations (1) and (2) as our dependent vari-
able that demonstrates the difference between the given points by country A to 
song of country B and the number of points assigned by all other countries in aver-
age of year t except country A (´quality´tB,−A). The bias leads to an overvaluation13 
(positive sign) or an undervaluation (negative sign). This has the considerable ad-
vantage that we have a continuous dependent variable instead of a categorical one 
like the final rank or the number of points given from country A to country B in 
year t (Spierdijk and Vellekoop 2009). Moreover, this model has the advantage that 
we do not have to control for quality anymore as, for example, Ginsburgh and 
Noury (2008) do. Therefore, we avoid problems of endogeneity and circularity.  
Accordingly, we define 𝑏𝑏𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 as our dependent variable (4)  
biasABt = αA + βAXABt + uABt   (4) 
and corresponding control variables XABt  (1 x V) for each dimension t = 1, …, T, A 
= 1, …,N, B= 1, …, M and V the number of several control variables.  
Finally, the estimation equation is shown in (5) in a compressed specification: 
biasA = αA + βAXB + uA  (5) 
12 We set the word “quality” in quotation marks since we do not want to pretend that this concept 
represents an indisputable operationalisation of a term as difficult as quality of artistic creations 
and performances. In particular, it can be highly controversial whether majority assessments and 
evaluations (mass-culture or popular culture) represent ‘quality’. For our purposes, however, it is 
exactly the deviation from the mass assessment among different groups of voters that we are 
looking for.  
13 See e.g. table 4. 
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We consider N equations. Because we have a continuous dependent variable in-
stead of a categorical one we estimate the equations of voting (5) by linear meth-
ods (OLS) as well as individually per country because intercepts and slopes vary 
with the partaking and voting countries (Spierdijk and Vellekoop 2009).   
4.3 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Our selection of explanatory variables is based on scientific literature in media and 
cultural economics concerning the ESC (see chapter 2). Because of the extensive 
discussion about the influence of the geographical position (inter alia Yair 1995; 
Gatherer 2004) and its effect on voting behavior we collect data regarding the ge-
ographical closeness of participating countries (ESC) and states of the Federal Re-
public of Germany (BSC). In order to capture neighboring countries we include a 
dummy to show whether participating countries share a common border. In con-
trast to Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009), we do not only use a dummy variable for 
neighboring countries, but also introduce the length of common border measured 
in km14. Thus, we assume the longer the common border, the more points partici-
pating countries award each other. We also collect the distance between the coun-
tries capitals in order to gauge geographical closeness. Against the background of 
BSC we create a dummy for a former Eastern part of Germany and a -Home Bias- 
dummy variable if the country votes for his own German State.  
We define independent variables with respect to the kind of performance. These 
explanatory variables characterize performance characteristics such as gender 
(male, female) of the artist and if the song is performed by a group, a (male-) solo-
ist or a duo. Haan et al. (2005) find evidence that the order of appearance has a 
systematic influence on the final points in the Eurovision Song Contest. Therefore, 
we defined an order-variable reflecting the order of appearance in which acts of 
the performing countries are viewed by the audience and jury. Because most win-
ning songs are performed in English, we assume that language plays a role for ex-
plaining the voting behavior. Therefore, we define dummies for the songs language 
14 We obtained the length of common border and the neighbor countries from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html. 
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marking if the song is sung in English or French. We also include a dummy if the 
performing country was the host of the contest in year t.  
In order to find linguistic dependences we include a dummy variable for the coun-
tries’ languages as a regressor in our voting analysis15. If country A and country B 
share a common official language we assume a higher bias in voting. 
For the period 1968 to 1972, Hofstede conducted an extensive cross-cultural 
investigation for a sample of forty countries. The aim of his study is to show the 
fundamental differences in how people from different countries experience and 
interpret their world. The research project was carried out with 116.000 employees 
by company IBM with a comparable professional position, but from different na-
tions. Using factor analysis of the received responses, Hofstede constructed four 
"dimensions" to describe each country’s culture. For each dimension a country-index 
of each participating nation is calculated. As in Ginsburgh and Noury (2008), we 
use Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions16 in order to gather the cultural diversity 
among the partaking countries.17 Thus, the explanatory variable is the distances 
between the countries’ index for a Hofstede dimension that votes and the coun-
tries’ index that receives the points. Because of cultural closeness, we assume the 
smaller the distance the higher the voting bias. The four dimensions of Hofstede 
are Individualism/Collectivism, Masculinity/Femininity, Uncertainty Avoidance and 
Power Distance.18 For the purpose of gathering cultural variety among the partici-
pating German states we use the empirical research model of Big Five personality 
traits dimensions, because there is a relationship between Hofstede’s cultural di-
mensions and the Big Five personality traits (McCrae and Terracciano 2005). These 
dimensions, based on the Five Factor Model (FFM) (Costa and McCrae 1992), de-
scribe human personality traits that are defined as "dimensions of individual differ-
ences in tendencies to show consistent patterns of thoughts, feelings, and actions" 
15 We have obtained the language variable from the french research center in international eco-
nomics (Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) and CIA World 
Factbook , see http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/bdd.asp. 
16 Also Long-term versus short-term orientation and Indulgence versus Restraint (IND), they are 
ignored in this study because of high incompleteness. 
17 We have obtained the cultural dimensions from http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html. 
18 See for more information http://geert-hofstede.com/serbia.html. 
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(McCrae and Costa 1990: 29). The five-factor dimensions consist of Neuroticism, 
Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness 
(McCrae and John 1992). A high value in Neuroticism refers to a high share of easi-
ly depressed and anxious individuals and a low share of extroverted personalities 
(which are very sociable and talkative), while Openness to Experience stands for 
creativity, artistic skills and unconventional human beings. The Agreeableness fac-
tor represents compassion, corporation, and trust, while Conscientiousness is char-
acterized by planned and organized behavior (Atkinson et al. 2000). We obtained 
the dataset for the 16 German states from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(SOEP) that collected regional values of the Big Five traits for each state of Germany 
in 2005. Research has shown that the regional differences between the Big Five 
dimensions influence for example entrepreneurship (Obschonka et al. 2013). 
Analyses in the research field of behavioral economics find evidence that economic 
agents’ decisions are often affected by religion (inter alia, Iannacconea 1998; Kuran 
1994). For this reason, we assume countries to give higher amounts of points to 
countries with the same religion. We create a dummy variable for religion if country 
A and B share at minimum one major religion. Regarding the ESC, we follow the 
procedure of Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009) and consider a religion if the percent-
age of individuals belonging to a certain religion is either the highest percentage 
among all religions, or if it is the second largest with not less than 20 percent. We 
differentiate between Catholics, Orthodox, Jewish, Muslims and Protestants.19 Con-
cerning the BSC, we differentiate between Catholics, Protestants and those who 
have no religious affiliations. We consider those religious denominations, if the 
percentage of members is not less than 40 percent. Table 5 offers a concise list of 
the explanatory variables and their descriptions. Because a lot of explanatory varia-
bles are time-invariant, we do not take into consideration any temporal changes. 
  
19 We have obtained the major religion from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/. 
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Geographical as-
pects 
NeighbAB  
 
Length_CBAB 
Capital_DisAB 
only for BSC: 
former GDRB 
 
Home_BiasAB 
 
If countries A and B are neighbors = 1 
Otherwise = 0 
length of common border in km of Countries A and B 
Distance between capitals of countries A and B in km 
 
If Country B was a former Eastern part of Germany =1 
Otherwise=0 
If countries A and B are the same German States = 1 
Otherwise = 0 
Language 
LangAB 
 
If Country B and Country A share a common official or primary 
language = 1 
Otherwise=0  
Performance 
Male_soloBt 
 
DuetBt 
 
GroupBt 
 
EnglishBt 
 
FrenchBt 
OrderBt 
 
HostBt 
 
If Country B´s song was sung by a male soloist in year t =1 
Otherwise=0 
If Country B´s song was sung by a female-male duet in year t =1 
Otherwise=0 
If Country B´s song was sung by a group in year t =1 
Otherwise=0 
If Country B´s song was in English in year t =1 
Otherwise=0 
If Country B´s song was in French in year t =1, otherwise=0 
Order of  Country B´s song of in year t (one for the first per-
forming song) 
If Country B was the host in year t =1 
Otherwise=0 
Cultural  
only for ESC: 
PDIAB 
IDVAB 
MASAB 
UAIAB 
 
only for BSC: 
OpennessAB 
AgreeablenessAB 
ExtraversionAB 
NeuroticismAB 
ConscientiousnessAB 
 
 
Difference between indices of power distance of countries A and 
B 
Difference between indices of individualism of countries A and B 
Difference between indices of masculinity of countries A and B 
Difference between indices of uncertainty avoidance of countries 
A and B 
 
Difference between indices of Openness of countries A and B 
Difference between indices of Agreeableness of countries A and 
B 
Difference between indices of Extraversion of countries A and B 
Difference between indices of Neuroticism of countries A and B 
Difference between indices of Conscientiousness of countries A 
and B 
Religion 
ReligionAB 
 
If Country A and B share at the minimum one major religion =1 
Otherwise=0 
 
Table 5 Possible explanatory variables of voting behavior 
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5 ESTIMATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 COMPARING THE ESC RESULTS TO FORMER STUDIES 
In general, the results from our linear voting model confirm the results by Spierdijk 
and Vellekoop (2009) to the extent that the ESC shows strong significantly biased 
voting patterns based on geographical proximity. More precisely, voting countries 
favor their neighbors and are negatively biased toward more distant countries 
(measured in terms of distance between the two capitals). Furthermore, the longer 
the common border, the higher the voting bias in favor of other participating 
countries (see table 7). Since we use a slightly different dataset that, in contrast to 
Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009), excludes the early years (1975-1997) but adds the 
more recent years (2004-2013), this can be viewed to support the robustness of 
their results. On the contrary, our average neighbor effect is strongly significant. 
This result can be explained by the fact that public audience voting plays a larger 
role in our dataset. Remarkably, when looking at our country-specific model (see 
table 8), no country coherently shows a significant anti-neighbor bias over the 
three indicators. Spierdijk and Vellekoop’s (2009: 417) prime example of anti-
neighbor bias, Macedonia, displays a pro-neighbor bias regarding the neighbor 
dummy variable and the Capital_Dis variable in our sample, whereas the variable 
Length_CB border suggests an anti-neighbor bias. The newer data of Macedonia 
might reflect its re-orientation as an independent country in contrast to trends in 
older data which could result from its status as a former Yugoslavian republic.    
In terms of the influence of religion, our average linear voting model supports the 
results of Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009). Countries, that share the same religion, 
are positively biased toward each other (see table 7). In our country specific model 
(see table 10 and table 13), our sample again shows considerably more countries 
with a respective voting bias than Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009). In line with the 
literature, all of the biases are in favor of same religions (see table 10). Regarding 
the cultural dimensions, we get a mixed picture that roughly resembles the results 
from Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009), confirming that cultural-biased voting plays a 
very relevant role for the contest outcomes (see table 14). For example, Denmark is 
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significantly influenced by the cultural dimensions of IDV, MAS and UAI. In our av-
erage voting model all cultural dimensions significantly influence the voting bias 
with a negative sign (see table 7). Thus, the closer the participating countries are in 
terms of culture, the higher the voting bias.  
As you can see (e.g. table 7) we estimated our model without including variables as 
well as with including variables of cultural dimensions. Because the study of Hof-
stede does not investigate all countries that vote in the ESC, the number of obser-
vations drops from 13119 to 7517. All in all, the estimation results remain virtually 
unchanged even after controlling for cultural aspects (see table 7). Religion also 
matters, but of course, turns out to be less significant when looking at the country-
specific model.  
Against the background of performance aspects, we could not find any influences 
based on performance characteristics such as gender, order, host or the number of 
singers. Again, this confirms the results by Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009). Never-
theless, also the language does not play a significant role anymore. On the contra-
ry, countries that share a common official or primary language are significantly 
positively biased toward each other (see table 7). 
5.2 VOTING BIAS IN THE BSC 
The first conclusion we can draw from the BSC analysis is that biased voting pat-
terns also exist in the BSC (see tables 15-24)20. Thus, biased voting patterns do not 
only take place among different countries in Europe but also within one of the big-
gest countries, namely Germany. This conclusion is important because it shows that 
favoring artists for other than artistic reasons does not depend on nationality and 
different nations being involved. Secondly, we can extend this result by demon-
strating that geographical proximity also matters with respect to the national con-
test. Thus, even within one and the same nation, effects of (regional) community 
closeness affect voting patterns (see table 15). 
20 Only OLS is discussed here, since the linear model with fixed effects leads to results that are very 
similar to those estimated. The same holds for the ESC.  
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The most obvious case of geographical preferences in voting behavior is the phe-
nomenon of patriotic voting in the BSC. In contrast to the ESC, the BSC allows its 
audience to vote for their own state. Consequently, German states award them-
selves around 8 points more than the number of points assigned by all other Ger-
man states on average throughout all the years (see table 15), leading to significant 
patriotic voting, displayed in a large bias with positive sign in the case of the BSC 
(see tables 15 and 17). This actually represents the strongest case of geographical-
ly-biased voting. Next to patriotic voting, voting biases in favor of neighboring 
states also occur in our linear voting model. All in all, German states are positively 
biased toward their neighbors and they also show a significant negative bias in-
creasing with the distance between the capitals (see table 15).21 This remains valid 
in the country-specific model. Bavaria, Hamburg, Lower Saxony and Saarland are 
positively biased towards their neighbors (Length_CB) and also Bremen, Schleswig-
Holstein and Saxony favor their neighbors (Capital_Dis). It is noticeable, however, 
that the neighbor dummy variable shows an antineighbor bias in most of the sig-
nificant cases (Hamburg, Lower Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt). Although this seems 
paradoxical at first sight, there may be specific explanations for this kind of voting 
behavior. For instance, Hamburg is negatively biased to its neighbors, but shows a 
positive bias regarding the length of common border and a negative one in terms 
of the distance to other capitals of German states. Hamburg only has two neigh-
boring German states (Lower Saxony and Schleswig Holstein) and because of Ham-
burg´s voting behavior we might conclude, that there is a special (positive) rela-
tionship to Schleswig Holstein, because the length of common border almost dou-
bles the border-length of Lower Saxony and also the distance to Schleswig Hol-
stein´s capital is distinctly smaller than the distance to Lower Saxony´s capital. 
Lower Saxony shows similar behavior. Here too, we can look at the neighboring 
German states and may conclude the favoring of German states that are located to 
the south of Lower Saxony. Also Saxony-Anhalt is negatively biased to its neigh-
bors. This might be explained by looking at the effect of being a former GDR. When 
looking at the country-specific model, there is also a special and highly interesting 
21 In an alternative version with a re-constructed points allocation excluding own-state votes, the 
neighboring bias becomes a bit stronger. This version can be supplied upon request. 
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effect in the data: the former German divide between a Western and an Eastern 
republic matters for voting behavior (see tables 16-17). Even in the time-span of 
15-23 years after the re-unification, the voting audience in the former GDR-states 
favors acts from other former GDR-states whereas the voting audience from former 
FRG-states disfavors acts from former GDR-states.22 Four decades of separation (fol-
lowing World War II) may have led to deviations in the cultural heritages of the two 
German states and that appears to be influencing voting behavior until the present 
day. The inner re-unification, thus, does not appear to be complete in regard to 
cultural contest events. Particularly noteworthy in this context is that especially the 
former GDR-states favor acts from other former GDR-states, e.g Saxony-Anhalt, 
Saxony and Thuringa are significantly positively biased towards states from the 
former Eastern part of Germany. Also Bremen, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-
Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein, which belonged to the former Western part of 
Germany, are significantly negatively biased to former GDR states. Because Saxony-
Anhalt favors the former GDR-states and borders almost completely former GDR-
states (Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringa) except Lower Saxony, the anti-neighbor 
effect might be attributable to the relationship to Lower Saxony (see table 17). On 
the aggregate level, the former GDR variable does not significantly influence the 
voting bias (see table 15). For that reason, the country-specific estimation model 
reaffirms the importance of capturing voting patterns more precisely. 
Regarding performance aspects, we could not find any influences based on per-
formance characteristics such as gender, order, host or the number of singers (see 
table 15). 
In terms of religion, the BSC surprisingly shows other-religion biased voting for sev-
eral of the Western German states (Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, North Rhine-
Westphalia). This stands in contrast to the ESC results and represents an interesting 
result in particular in the cases where it relates to non-neighboring states or neigh-
boring states that display no geographical proximity bias.  
22 GDR = German Democratic Republic (the former Eastern part of Germany); FRG = Federal Re-
public of Germany (the former Western part of Germany).  
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Similar to the ESC case, we also estimated our model with and without variables of 
the Big Five dimensions (see table 15). Again, our estimation equation leads to very 
similar results, which also underlines the robustness of our model. Geographical 
proximity also plays nearly the same role in explaining the voting bias. Thus, neigh-
bor, capital distance and the home-bias variable stay significant at the three star 
level. The same tendency can be discerned in our country-specific model. Only 
some of the voting countries turn out to be insignificant in terms of neighborhood 
(Hamburg, Saxony-Anhalt) and of being a former GDR state (Saxony-Anhalt, 
Schleswig-Holstein and Saxony) or regarding the home-bias effect (13 out of 16 
Germans states turn out to be significant). The only exception is our religious con-
fession variable, which turns out to be insignificant (from a one star level in model 
(1)) when controlling for cultural dimensions. Therefore, we have to be careful to 
interpret these results. Pro- or anti-religious confession effects may merely stand for 
an extended neighborhood-effect. Then, religion would not play any significant 
role in explaining the voting bias. Regarding the cultural aspects, we get a mixed 
picture as well, that resembles the results from the ESC, confirming that culturally-
biased voting also plays a significant role for the contest outcomes, although cul-
tural differences are much smaller.    
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5.3 COMPARING ESC AND BSC 
Explanatory 
Variables 
ESC            BSC                                
magnitude of 
bias  
magnitude of 
bias 
Neighb 52.9 % 30.77 % 
Length_CB 59.1 % 25 % 
Capital_Dis 35.4 % 31.25 % 
Language 40 %  
Former GDR  43.75% 
Home Bias  100 % 
Male_solo 6.25 % 6.25 % 
Duet 12.5 % 0 % 
Group 8.33 % 6.25 % 
English 37.5%  
French 6.5 %  
Order 10.4 % 0% 
Host 0 % 6.25 % 
Religion 39.1 % 25 % 
Table 6 Comparison between the magnitude of bias in the ESC and BSC (without 
cultural aspects) 23 
In general, voting behavior in the ESC and BSC hardly differ from one another (see 
table 7 and table 15). Table 6 visualizes a comparison of the results by displaying 
the share of cases in which the respective bias occurred in a significant way in the 
country-specific model. For instance, in the ESC the variable Neighb was significant 
in 52.9 per cent of all cases (= of all country-pairs voting for each other), whereas 
it was 30.8 per cent in the BSC. We choose this way of summarizing the results of 
the complex country-specific model in order to make the comparison more accessi-
ble and more transparent.  
Generally, geographical proximity significantly influences voting patterns in both 
contests. However, the magnitude of biases differs. While the magnitude of bias 
regarding Capital_Dis is very similar (35.4 per cent in the ESC versus 31.3 per cent 
in the BSC), voting bias occurs less frequently in the BSC than in the ESC regarding 
the dummy variable (30.8 per cent to 52.9 per cent) as well as regarding the varia-
23 Because there are hardly any changes when estimating with or without the cultural aspects and 
also hardly any changes in adj R-squared, we compare our estimation results by using the coun-
try-specific model without controlling for culture.  
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ble Length_CB (25 per cent to 59.1 per cent). Notwithstanding, one should be care-
ful to conclude a smaller voting bias for the national contest because due to one of 
the few differences in rules the national contest is additionally characterized by 
comprehensive patriotic voting (home bias). Unfortunately, we cannot know for 
whom the patriotic voters in the BSC would have voted if they had not been al-
lowed to vote for their home state. If they had over-proportionally voted for one of 
their neighbor states, then the non-home neighbor bias would have been in-
creased. This does not seem to be very implausible. Indication supporting this 
speculation can be drawn from an alternative model that we estimated and in 
which we re-allocated the BSC-points excluding patriotic voting.24 In this model 
variant, the neighbor bias increases. 
It is conspicuous that performance characteristics like duo, group, order, host 
country and male solo singer for both ESC and BSC do not play any major role, 
when looking at the average linear voting model in table 7 and table 15. Because 
we did not measure the language differences in Germany, we cannot compare 
these results. Unfortunately, we did not find usable data on the closeness of Ger-
man accents. 
Furthermore, cultural similarities also significantly matter for both contests. The Big 
Five traits and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions negatively influence the bias, the 
higher the difference between their cultural indices are. While all dimensions of 
Hofstede show a negative sign, German states favor German states that do not 
show similar indices in Extraversion and Conscientiousness (see table 7, model (2) 
and 15 model (2)). Religion also matters and influences the voting bias for both of 
the contests. However, religion turns out to be insignificant for the BSC, when in-
cluding variables explaining culture (see table 7 and 15).  
  
24 Basically, the alternative model with points re-allocation excludes the patriotic voters which does not solve 
the problem of what the counterfactual votes of the patriotic voters would have looked like. Therefore, we 
chose not to report and discuss it in detail in this paper. Information can be obtained from the authors upon 
request. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
Culturally-biased voting has been a major point of discussion with respect to the 
ESC. People ostensibly voting for their neighbor countries instead of judging ac-
cording to musical quality triggered several controversies. It is a common underly-
ing assumption that the international character of the song contest and, thus, the 
heterogeneity of the participating countries plays an important role in motivating 
the biases because neighboring countries often are less ‘different’ than more dis-
tant countries and, thus, voters are more sympathetic to and more willing to vote 
for them. If the cultural bias is driven by the heterogeneity of countries, then it 
should be less relevant – or not relevant at all – in a national contest with consider-
ably more homogenous participants. However, comparing the voting patterns of 
the European-wide ESC with the inner-German derivative BSC reveals that geo-
graphically biased voting is relevant for national contests as well. In our analysis, 
we find empirical evidence for the existence of strong geographical voting bias in 
both contests. Notwithstanding this, bias favoring neighboring countries occurs 
less frequently in the national contest (BSC) than in the international contest (ESC). 
On the other hand, however, the BSC-specific phenomenon of patriotic voting im-
plies that overall geographic bias in the national contest is not necessarily smaller 
than in the international context. Altogether, the comparative homogeneity of par-
ticipants in the national contest does not erode strong voting bias in favor of geo-
graphical proximity compared to the comparatively more heterogeneous partici-
pants in the ESC. Moreover, control variables and other potential influences display 
very similar patterns. 
A special result regarding the national contest relates to effects of a common herit-
age that may add to the geographical proximity preference in particular cases. For 
the inner-German contest (BSC), the former East-West-German divide (1946-1990) 
still plays a role in voting patterns even after more than a decade of re-unification. 
Altogether, geographical voting biases are not exclusive to international contests. 
Instead, elements of local support appear to represent a fundamental preference of 
audiences and ‘neutral’, exclusively ‘quality-based’ voting cannot be expected even 
in cases of comparatively homogenous cultural and linguistic traits. 
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Appendix 
Table 7: Linear Voting Model, Eurovision Song Contest  
 (1) (2) 
   
NeighbAB 1.810*** 0.969*** 
 (11.44) (4.76) 
   
Length_CBAB 0.000857*** 0.00150*** 
 (3.75) (4.79) 
   
Capital_DisAB -0.000232*** -0.000195*** 
 (-7.19) (-3.87) 
   
LangAB 1.589*** 0.829*** 
 (10.51) (4.70) 
   
Male_soloBt 0.0218 0.0204 
 (0.35) (0.26) 
   
DuetBt 0.0790 0.0109 
 (0.81) (0.09) 
   
GroupBt 0.00316 -0.00408 
 (0.04) (-0.04) 
   
EnglishBt 0.0195 0.110 
 (0.36) (1.55) 
   
FrenchBt -0.327 -0.355 
 (-1.96) (-1.91) 
   
OrderBt 0.00118 0.00615 
 (0.32) (1.32) 
   
HostBt -0.000540 -0.0230 
 (-0.00) (-0.14) 
   
ReligionAB 0.551*** 0.274*** 
 (8.94) (3.43) 
   
PDIAB  -0.00544** 
  (-2.60) 
   
IDVAB  -0.00566* 
  (-2.33) 
   
MASAB  -0.00604** 
  (-3.15) 
   
UAIAB  -0.00529** 
  (-2.72) 
   
_cons -0.0378 0.466** 
 (-0.40) (2.86) 
N 13119 7517 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 8: Country-Specific linear voting model, Eurovision Song Contest, 1 
CountryA Neighb 
 
Length_CB 
 
Capital_Dis 
  
Lang 
 Albania -18.32 (-1.95) 0.121* (2.58) -0.000362 (-1.34) 
  Andorra 
 
0.0976** (3.08) 0.000358 (0.80) 
 
3.122 (1.40) 
Armenia 3.456* (2.32) -0.0105*** (-4.70) -0.000783** (-3.01) 
  Austria -3.650** (-2.83) 0.00734** (2.99) -0.00149*** (-4.60) 0.601 (0.70) 
Azerbaijan 6.419*** (5.43) -0.0132*** (-6.50) -0.00136*** (-5.55) 
  Belarus -0.977 (-0.84) 0.00657*** (5.83) 0.000499 (1.92) 
   Belgium -0.348 (-0.27) 0.00883*** (3.36) 0.00104*** (4.43) 
 
0.468 (0.56) 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 5.710*** (3.53) 0.000482 (0.23) -0.00100*** (-4.16) 
  Bulgaria 6.632*** (4.75) -0.00821* (-2.59) 0.000342 (0.99) 
   Croatia 1.394 (1.14) 0.00375* (2.00) -0.000735** (-2.86) 2.590* (2.31) 
Cyprus 
   
0.000307 (1.57) 
 
3.873*** (6.03) 
Czech Republic 56.95 (0.12) -0.0775 (-0.12) 0.00171** (3.25) 
   Denmark 
 
-0.00741 (-1.26) -0.000337 (-1.41) 
  Estonia 8.235* (1.98) -0.237 (-1.87) -0.000659*** (-3.37) 
  Finland 0.0958 (0.04) 0.000823 (0.38) -0.000275 (-1.06) 2.298 (1.61) 
France 0.106 (0.04) 0.00192 (0.41) 0.00124*** (4.67) 
 
0.990 (0.93) 
Georgia 4.400* (2.58) -0.00376 (-1.45) -0.000835* (-2.32) 
  Germany 1.167 (1.33) -0.000356 (-0.20) 0.000221 (0.89) 
 
0.177 (0.23) 
Greece -3.516 (-1.61) 0.0212* (2.20) -0.000194 (-0.85) 9.744*** (9.45) 
Hungary 0.386 (0.34) 0.00103 (0.29) 0.000540 (1.48) 
   Iceland 
   
-0.000617*** (-3.49) 
  Ireland 
 
0.00155 (0.64) -0.00111*** (-4.85) 1.311 (1.88) 
Israel 
   
0.000192 (1.32) 
 
-0.559 (-1.15) 
Italy -8.541 (-1.32) 0.0150 (0.98) -0.00197** (-2.98) -4.450 (-0.77) 
Latvia 2.914* (2.13) 0.00464 (1.31) -0.000294 (-1.22) 
  Lithuania 3.947*** (3.48) 0.00251 (0.90) -0.0000411 (-0.16) 
  Macedonia 8.184*** (5.74) -0.0356*** (-4.91) -0.00156*** (-5.90) 
  Malta 
   
0.000231 (1.00) 
 
1.705** (3.25) 
Moldova 
 
0.00477*** (4.84) 0.000338 (1.14) 
 
6.880*** (7.24) 
Monaco 
 
1.590* (2.59) -0.000167 (-0.19) 
  Montenegro 5.038** (2.71) 0.00976 (0.94) -0.000235 (-0.66) -1.186 (-0.86) 
Netherlands 
 
0.00368** (2.78) 0.000326 (1.44) 
 
4.099*** (3.38) 
Norway -1.786* (-2.20) 0.00300*** (3.90) -0.000160 (-0.71) 
  Poland -0.886 (-0.85) 0.00633* (2.48) -0.000355 (-1.42) 
  Portugal 
 
0.00458*** (5.46) -0.000370 (-1.22) 
  Romania 19.95** (2.89) -0.0403** (-2.90) -0.000457 (-1.76) 7.452*** (5.52) 
Russia 1.533* (2.29) 0.000656 (1.08) 0.000218 (0.74) 
   San Marino 
 
0.0942 (0.94) 0.0000140 (0.03) 
 
0.0182 (0.01) 
Serbia 8.116*** (5.55) -0.0186*** (-4.67) -0.000446 (-1.29) 3.937*** (3.49) 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 7.843*** (5.14) -0.0206*** (-5.03) -0.00160* (-2.64) 2.221 (1.81) 
Slovakia 0.954 (0.54) 0.000739 (0.18) 0.0000623 (0.14) 
   Slovenia -4.167*** (-3.32) 0.0198*** (5.54) -0.00187*** (-7.91) 
  Spain -3.273 (-1.43) 0.00541* (2.17) -0.0000132 (-0.05) 
  Sweden 
 
0.00177*** (3.45) -0.0000899 (-0.41) 3.145** (3.25) 
Switzerland 5.898** (2.83) -0.00834* (-2.43) -0.00122*** (-3.69) -0.575 (-0.42) 
Turkey 1.529 (1.03) 0.00508 (0.72) -0.0000950 (-0.47) -1.251 (-1.25) 
Ukraine -1.285 (-1.38) 0.00504*** (5.63) 0.0000455 (0.15) 
   United Kingdom 
 
0.00726* (2.42) -0.000420 (-1.91) 2.061** (3.16) 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 9: Country-Specific linear voting model, Eurovision Song Contest, continued 2 
CountryA Male_solo  Duet  Group  English  French  
Albania 0.572 (1.33) 0.472 (0.68) -0.333 (-0.61) -0.514 (-1.31) -0.0464 (-0.03) 
Andorra -0.488 (-0.80) -0.101 (-0.11) 0.251 (0.36) 0.250 (0.47) -3.854 (-1.59) 
Armenia -0.0342 (-0.06) 1.079 (1.25) -1.341 (-1.90) 0.192 (0.39) 3.653* (2.08) 
Austria 0.289 (0.66) -0.158 (-0.23) 0.0921 (0.17) -1.307*** (-3.45) -1.127 (-0.99) 
Azerbaijan -0.309 (-0.61) 1.196 (1.29) -0.235 (-0.31) 0.345 (0.75) -0.840 (-0.45) 
Belarus -0.226 (-0.63) -0.0775 (-0.13) 0.291 (0.64) 0.937** (2.89) 1.570 (1.29) 
Belgium -0.326 (-0.95) -1.199* (-2.24) 0.111 (0.26) -0.0396 (-0.13) -4.384*** (-3.72) 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
-0.0174 (-0.05) 0.0581 (0.10) -0.422 (-0.91) -0.624 (-1.89) 1.702 (1.73) 
Bulgaria 0.180 (0.39) -0.855 (-1.14) 0.196 (0.34) 1.035* (2.47) 0.211 (0.14) 
Croatia -0.236 (-0.70) 0.376 (0.73) -0.368 (-0.87) -0.303 (-1.02) -1.213 (-1.44) 
Cyprus 0.0908 (0.25) 1.158* (2.05) -0.885 (-1.94) 0.235 (0.74) 0.0694 (0.08) 
Czech Re-
public 
-0.319 (-0.36) 1.857 (1.54) -0.229 (-0.22) -1.639* (-2.27) -1.637 (-0.55) 
Denmark 0.424 (1.16) 0.0326 (0.06) 0.334 (0.74) 0.971** (2.97) 1.250 (1.30) 
Estonia 0.0846 (0.28) 0.0763 (0.16) 0.455 (1.13) 0.234 (0.85) 0.339 (0.45) 
Finland 0.100 (0.26) -0.499 (-0.80) 0.0899 (0.18) -0.751* (-2.19) 0.893 (0.95) 
France 0.961* (2.56) -0.572 (-0.99) 0.582 (1.22) -2.107*** (-6.32) -0.516 (-0.26) 
Georgia -0.0802 (-0.15) 0.984 (1.07) -1.556* (-2.10) 0.457 (0.95) -0.920 (-0.33) 
Germany 0.164 (0.46) -1.113* (-2.04) 0.00465 (0.01) -0.793* (-2.53) -1.412 (-1.49) 
Greece 0.294 (0.86) 0.481 (0.87) -0.164 (-0.36) -0.138 (-0.45) 1.023 (1.13) 
Hungary -0.132 (-0.28) 0.816 (1.01) -0.499 (-0.80) 0.639 (1.54) -0.749 (-0.52) 
Iceland 0.0941 (0.27) 0.623 (1.15) 0.126 (0.29) 0.262 (0.83) 1.098 (1.12) 
Ireland -0.106 (-0.28) 0.157 (0.27) 0.149 (0.32) 1.432*** (4.30) 0.159 (0.16) 
Israel -0.820* (-2.39) 0.124 (0.23) -0.379 (-0.88) 0.711* (2.33) 0.644 (0.76) 
Italy -0.709 (-0.80) -2.501 (-1.33) 3.238* (2.36) 0.350 (0.39)   
Latvia 0.0193 (0.06) 0.641 (1.17) 0.0331 (0.07) 0.250 (0.80) 0.522 (0.57) 
Lithuania -0.0512 (-0.13) 0.170 (0.28) 0.0824 (0.17) 0.983** (2.81) 1.055 (0.92) 
Macedonia -0.642 (-1.67) 0.962 (1.60) -0.996* (-2.01) -0.214 (-0.62) -0.490 (-0.52) 
Malta -0.343 (-0.93) 1.489** (2.65) -1.089* (-2.33) 1.429*** (4.31) -0.219 (-0.24) 
Moldova 0.154 (0.38) 0.749 (1.15) 0.296 (0.59) 0.703* (1.98) 0.00386 (0.00) 
Monaco 1.055 (1.01) -0.981 (-0.55) 0.742 (0.63) -0.257 (-0.27) -8.865 (-1.96) 
Montenegro 0.211 (0.43) -0.106 (-0.12) 0.550 (0.80) -0.555 (-1.23) -1.193 (-0.51) 
Netherlands 0.208 (0.59) -0.683 (-1.25) -0.0942 (-0.21) -0.419 (-1.37) -0.231 (-0.24) 
Norway 0.467 (1.34) -0.608 (-1.13) 0.271 (0.62) 0.619* (2.02) 1.811* (1.98) 
Poland -0.0750 (-0.20) 0.895 (1.57) -0.0798 (-0.17) -0.282 (-0.87) 0.570 (0.58) 
Portugal 0.364 (0.90) 0.664 (1.05) 0.0989 (0.20) -0.511 (-1.42) 0.251 (0.22) 
Romania -0.0131 (-0.03) 1.350* (2.22) -0.231 (-0.47) -0.257 (-0.77) 0.143 (0.16) 
Russia -0.134 (-0.33) 0.512 (0.81) -0.515 (-0.99) -0.0182 (-0.05) 0.445 (0.42) 
San Marino 0.113 (0.15) -0.733 (-0.50) 0.789 (0.68) -1.156 (-1.57)   
Serbia -0.509 (-1.11) -0.489 (-0.65) -1.087 (-1.77) 0.415 (0.99) 1.862 (1.04) 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
-0.379 (-0.56) -0.665 (-0.60) -1.083 (-1.48) 0.129 (0.22) 0.692 (0.41) 
Slovakia 0.404 (0.61) -1.722 (-1.45) 1.880 (1.79) 0.208 (0.35) -0.480 (-0.29) 
Slovenia 0.698* (2.15) -0.453 (-0.89) 0.665 (1.58) -0.678* (-2.41) 0.385 (0.44) 
Spain 0.303 (0.83) 1.252* (2.22) -0.182 (-0.39) -0.751* (-2.32) -0.457 (-0.41) 
Sweden 0.244 (0.71) 0.160 (0.31) -0.177 (-0.41) 0.339 (1.14) 0.0296 (0.04) 
Switzerland 0.128 (0.31) -0.236 (-0.35) -0.417 (-0.76) -1.720*** (-4.65) -1.859 (-1.46) 
Turkey -0.298 (-0.81) 0.0235 (0.04) -0.166 (-0.37) 0.289 (0.91) -0.596 (-0.69) 
Ukraine -0.104 (-0.26) 0.489 (0.75) 0.0615 (0.12) -0.0410 (-0.11) -0.495 (-0.39) 
United King-
dom 
0.0710 (0.20) -0.674 (-1.28) 0.820 (1.89) 1.346*** (4.47) 0.649 (0.75) 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 10: Country-Specific linear voting model, Eurovision Song Contest, continued 3 
CountryA Order 
 
Host 
 
Religion 
 
_cons 
 
N 
Albania -0.0175 (-0.68) -0.598 (-0.65) 3.443*** (5.44) 0.202 (0.33) 242 
Andorra 0.0254 (0.70) -0.285 (-0.23) 1.547* (2.09) -2.198 (-1.83) 146 
Armenia 0.0302 (0.92) 0.961 (0.83) 
  
1.755 (1.96) 168 
Austria 0.0275 (1.06) -0.419 (-0.47) -0.176 (-0.42) 2.219*** (3.43) 240 
Azerbaijan 0.0301 (0.97) -1.168 (-0.97) -0.984 (-1.15) 3.431*** (3.56) 146 
Belarus 0.0111 (0.51) -0.235 (-0.31) -0.0344 (-0.10) -2.139*** (-3.52) 245 
Belgium -0.00948 (-0.47) 0.185 (0.26) 0.924* (2.38) -1.869** (-2.99) 362 
Bosnia and Her-
zegovina -0.0146 (-0.67) -0.0933 (-0.12) 2.694*** (4.67) 1.538** (2.88) 305 
Bulgaria -0.0647* (-2.31) 0.767 (0.78) 0.797 (1.52) -1.156 (-1.53) 223 
Croatia -0.0223 (-1.13) 0.189 (0.27) -0.0968 (-0.30) 1.148* (2.00) 382 
Cyprus -0.0628** (-2.99) 0.0867 (0.12) 1.777*** (4.67) -0.769 (-1.25) 361 
Czech Republic 0.0269 (0.54) 2.443 (1.40) -0.557 (-0.66) -2.077 (-1.67) 74 
Denmark 0.00312 (0.15) 0.622 (0.80) 2.939*** (6.80) -1.023 (-1.84) 330 
Estonia -0.00352 (-0.20) -0.416 (-0.63) 1.912*** (5.30) 0.107 (0.20) 383 
Finland -0.00327 (-0.14) -1.276 (-1.51) 2.107*** (4.49) 0.276 (0.41) 312 
France 0.00412 (0.19) -0.0113 (-0.01) 1.265** (2.78) -1.892** (-2.60) 377 
Georgia -0.0562 (-1.77) -0.554 (-0.48) -0.526 (-0.74) 2.613* (2.08) 146 
Germany 0.0411* (2.02) 1.417 (1.89) -0.427 (-1.13) -0.314 (-0.59) 377 
Greece 0.00497 (0.25) -0.391 (-0.53) 0.805* (2.15) -0.209 (-0.37) 332 
Hungary 0.0568 (1.95) -0.985 (-0.98) -0.284 (-0.66) -1.653* (-2.31) 194 
Iceland -0.0371 (-1.82) -0.0982 (-0.14) 2.637*** (6.47) 1.413* (2.00) 333 
Ireland -0.0292 (-1.31) -1.248 (-1.61) 0.0189 (0.05) 1.684* (2.33) 357 
Israel -0.0283 (-1.42) -1.000 (-1.38) -0.404 (-0.15) -0.161 (-0.31) 382 
Italy 0.0235 (0.44) 0.248 (0.13) -0.0227 (-0.02) 2.797 (2.00) 74 
Latvia 0.00333 (0.16) -0.746 (-1.00) 1.318*** (3.41) -0.626 (-1.02) 337 
Lithuania 0.0127 (0.54) 0.310 (0.38) 0.532 (1.49) -1.400* (-2.29) 309 
Macedonia -0.00147 (-0.07) 0.471 (0.59) -0.314 (-0.74) 2.597*** (4.47) 313 
Malta -0.0370 (-1.73) -0.556 (-0.73) -0.0113 (-0.03) -0.716 (-1.22) 381 
Moldova 0.00815 (0.34) 1.364 (1.62) 1.022* (2.27) -2.172** (-3.21) 216 
Monaco 0.00385 (0.06) 0.286 (0.13) 1.673 (1.39) -1.023 (-0.55) 72 
Montenegro -0.0259 (-0.86) 0.449 (0.42) 0.527 (0.99) -0.0380 (-0.05) 126 
Netherlands 0.0123 (0.59) 0.590 (0.80) -0.00580 (-0.02) -0.606 (-0.98) 362 
Norway -0.0178 (-0.86) 0.144 (0.19) 2.084*** (4.66) -0.591 (-0.99) 356 
Poland 0.0638** (2.85) 0.895 (1.15) -0.0304 (-0.09) -0.550 (-0.94) 287 
Portugal 0.0292 (1.22) -0.397 (-0.47) 0.160 (0.32) 0.345 (0.32) 312 
Romania 0.0176 (0.79) 0.295 (0.38) 0.538 (1.28) 0.114 (0.19) 333 
Russia 0.0240 (1.02) -1.602 (-1.84) 0.822* (1.97) -1.129 (-1.33) 331 
San Marino -0.0454 (-0.98) -1.380 (-0.81) 0.331 (0.42) 0.926 (0.80) 102 
Serbia -0.0110 (-0.40) -1.161 (-1.11) 0.864 (1.83) 0.302 (0.40) 171 
Serbia and Mon-
tenegro -0.0390 (-0.93) 0.0277 (0.02) 
  
2.249* (2.14) 70 
Slovakia 0.0192 (0.48) -1.018 (-0.70) 0.347 (0.54) -1.000 (-0.97) 125 
Slovenia -0.00736 (-0.38) 0.197 (0.29) -1.236*** (-4.02) 2.912*** (5.70) 362 
Spain 0.0595** (2.78) -1.347 (-1.80) 0.555 (1.23) -0.735 (-0.82) 377 
Sweden -0.0128 (-0.65) 0.865 (1.17) 1.759*** (4.18) -0.516 (-0.92) 378 
Switzerland 0.0106 (0.43) 0.361 (0.41) 0.0389 (0.08) 2.582*** (3.38) 315 
Turkey -0.0213 (-1.00) 0.903 (1.18) 5.413*** (7.96) -0.0883 (-0.15) 353 
Ukraine 0.0223 (0.93) -0.257 (-0.29) -0.591 (-1.33) -0.556 (-0.78) 263 
United Kingdom 0.0266 (1.32) -0.563 (-0.78) 0.346 (0.91) -0.955 (-1.55) 377 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 11: Country-Specific linear voting model, Eurovision Song Contest including 
cultural dimensions 1 
 
Neighb 
 
Length_CB 
 
Capital_Dis 
 
Lang 
 Austria -4.627*** (-3.77) 0.00691** (3.04) -0.00166** (-3.05) 0.398 (0.49) 
Belgium -1.057 (-0.84) 0.00868** (3.23) 0.00234*** (5.12) 2.662** (2.95) 
Bulgaria 6.532*** (3.66) -0.00819* (-1.98) 0.000369 (0.63) 
  Croatia -5.776 (-1.83) 0.0198** (3.24) 0.000117 (0.29) 6.981*** (3.85) 
Czech Republic 71.27 (0.21) -0.0986 (-0.20) 0.000857 (1.30) 
  Denmark 
  
0.0106 (1.57) 0.000748 (1.83) 
  Estonia 119.6** (2.64) -0.350* (-2.53) -0.000916*** (-3.63) 
  Finland 0.159 (0.06) 0.000786 (0.32) -0.000716* (-2.09) 2.756 (1.78) 
France 2.633 (1.00) -0.00179 (-0.35) 0.00188*** (3.40) 1.529 (1.39) 
Germany 1.966 (1.80) -0.00102 (-0.51) 0.000779* (2.10) -0.596 (-0.71) 
Greece -6.822** (-3.24) 0.0291** (3.30) -0.000344 (-1.21) 
  Hungary -1.637 (-0.87) 0.000733 (0.17) -0.00124* (-1.99) 
  Ireland 
  
0.0126** (3.03) 0.000316 (0.73) -0.408 (-0.47) 
Israel 
    
0.000591* (2.55) -0.562 (-0.97) 
Italy -10.51 (-1.21) 0.0194 (0.94) -0.00127 (-0.96) -5.741 (-0.82) 
Latvia 6.276** (3.13) -0.00252 (-0.45) -0.0000155 (-0.04) 
  Lithuania 4.533** (3.07) 0.00457 (1.16) -0.000264 (-0.77) 
  Malta 
    
-0.000556 (-1.48) 1.812** (2.69) 
Netherlands 
  
0.00237 (1.70) 0.000316 (0.88) 5.461*** (4.21) 
Norway -2.415** (-2.74) 0.00357*** (4.19) -0.0000452 (-0.14) 
  Poland 0.0815 (0.08) -0.00175 (-0.56) -0.000879** (-2.74) 
  Portugal 
  
0.00442*** (4.61) -0.000910* (-2.01) 
  Romania 25.46** (2.67) -0.0526** (-2.62) -0.000739 (-1.96) 
  Russia 1.253 (1.72) -0.00147 (-1.35) -0.0000588 (-0.17) 
  Serbia 5.529* (2.23) -0.0156* (-2.38) -0.00000654 (-0.01) 2.793 (1.16) 
Slovakia -1.029 (-0.25) 0.00431 (0.62) -0.000308 (-0.37) 
  Slovenia -2.319 (-1.58) 0.0153*** (3.53) -0.00202*** (-5.18) 
  Spain -3.457 (-1.48) 0.00497 (1.95) -0.00112 (-1.87) 
  Sweden 
  
0.00185*** (3.48) -0.0000451 (-0.15) 3.493*** (3.74) 
Switzerland 3.868 (1.89) -0.00539 (-1.62) -0.000613 (-1.15) 1.013 (0.72) 
Turkey -9.433 (-0.54) 0.0550 (0.66) 0.000486 (1.36) 
  United Kingdom 
 
0.0146*** (3.67) 0.000271 (0.74) 0.504 (0.65) 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 12: Country-Specific linear voting model, Eurovision Song Contest including 
cultural dimensions, continued 2 
 
Male_solo 
 
Duet 
 
Group 
 
English 
 
French 
 Austria -0.0926 (-0.20) -0.670 (-0.96) -0.0843 (-0.15) -1.081* (-2.44) -1.398 (-1.32) 
Belgium -0.226 (-0.60) -1.147 (-1.96) 0.207 (0.44) 0.165 (0.46) -4.264*** (-3.73) 
Bulgaria 0.270 (0.52) -0.654 (-0.74) 0.386 (0.60) 0.819 (1.56) 0.658 (0.42) 
Croatia -0.116 (-0.33) -0.0907 (-0.17) -0.0304 (-0.07) 0.0614 (0.17) -0.771 (-0.91) 
Czech Republic -0.547 (-0.69) 1.352 (1.42) 0.664 (0.73) -1.170 (-1.75) -1.063 (-0.49) 
Denmark 0.0962 (0.24) -0.0880 (-0.14) 0.139 (0.29) 1.334*** (3.57) 0.547 (0.54) 
Estonia -0.0205 (-0.06) -0.250 (-0.47) 0.726 (1.63) -0.00502 (-0.02) -0.128 (-0.17) 
Finland -0.163 (-0.36) -0.969 (-1.30) -0.0774 (-0.13) -0.755 (-1.72) 0.204 (0.20) 
France 0.569 (1.33) -0.539 (-0.82) 0.281 (0.52) -1.981*** (-4.62) -0.543 (-0.27) 
Germany -0.0530 (-0.13) -1.413* (-2.28) -0.103 (-0.20) -0.237 (-0.61) -1.040 (-1.07) 
Greece 0.663 (1.91) -0.253 (-0.46) 0.536 (1.15) -0.384 (-1.15) 0.531 (0.63) 
Hungary -0.312 (-0.61) 0.325 (0.36) -0.971 (-1.39) -0.200 (-0.39) -0.982 (-0.68) 
Ireland -0.207 (-0.47) 0.690 (1.02) -0.0103 (-0.02) 1.232** (3.03) -0.397 (-0.34) 
Israel -0.964* (-2.57) 0.0423 (0.07) -0.136 (-0.29) 0.600 (1.62) 0.224 (0.26) 
Italy -0.790 (-0.73) 0.646 (0.21) 2.633 (1.43) 1.062 (0.82) 
  Latvia -0.255 (-0.67) 0.937 (1.55) 0.0787 (0.16) -0.0602 (-0.16) -1.238 (-1.30) 
Lithuania 0.439 (1.07) 0.180 (0.28) 0.0539 (0.11) 0.283 (0.69) 0.812 (0.77) 
Malta -0.114 (-0.29) 1.467* (2.47) -0.481 (-0.98) 0.933* (2.45) 0.294 (0.34) 
Netherlands 0.0449 (0.11) -0.725 (-1.18) -0.411 (-0.83) -0.468 (-1.27) 0.560 (0.55) 
Norway 0.375 (0.98) -0.858 (-1.46) 0.0428 (0.09) 0.917** (2.60) 0.711 (0.73) 
Poland -0.227 (-0.56) 0.667 (1.11) -0.0819 (-0.17) -0.487 (-1.29) 0.392 (0.41) 
Portugal 0.427 (1.01) 1.092 (1.67) -0.267 (-0.50) -0.718 (-1.77) 0.324 (0.28) 
Romania -0.0277 (-0.06) 2.182** (3.07) -0.851 (-1.51) 0.167 (0.38) 0.779 (0.76) 
Russia -0.398 (-0.93) 0.443 (0.65) -0.772 (-1.38) 0.0534 (0.12) -0.513 (-0.49) 
Serbia -1.074* (-2.08) 0.755 (0.83) -1.924** (-2.79) 0.683 (1.31) 2.006 (1.12) 
Slovakia -0.0502 (-0.06) -1.716 (-1.04) 1.637 (1.13) 0.272 (0.34) -0.0200 (-0.01) 
Slovenia 0.465 (1.32) -0.511 (-0.94) 0.455 (1.01) -0.717* (-2.09) 0.693 (0.78) 
Spain 0.372 (0.89) 1.645* (2.54) -0.0748 (-0.14) -0.828* (-2.00) -0.563 (-0.50) 
Sweden 0.215 (0.58) 0.356 (0.63) -0.484 (-1.05) 0.529 (1.57) -0.0597 (-0.07) 
Switzerland -0.0426 (-0.10) -0.574 (-0.79) -0.495 (-0.84) -1.807*** (-4.23) -1.100 (-0.90) 
Turkey -0.134 (-0.33) 0.234 (0.39) -0.0351 (-0.07) 0.797* (2.04) -0.424 (-0.46) 
United Kingdom -0.0234 (-0.06) -0.218 (-0.36) 0.532 (1.08) 1.459*** (3.98) 1.405 (1.47) 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 13: Country-Specific linear voting model, Eurovision Song Contest including 
cultural dimensions, continued 3 
 
Order 
 
Host 
 
Religion 
 Austria 0.0414 (1.53) 0.346 (0.37) -0.215 (-0.46) 
Belgium -0.0221 (-1.01) 0.200 (0.27) 0.865 (1.62) 
Bulgaria -0.0761* (-2.41) 0.325 (0.30) 1.172 (1.23) 
Croatia -0.0350 (-1.69) 0.867 (1.26) 0.898* (2.27) 
Czech Republic 0.0255 (0.59) 3.661** (2.75) 0.896 (1.19) 
Denmark 0.0318 (1.35) 1.078 (1.35) 0.692 (1.03) 
Estonia 0.0140 (0.70) -0.185 (-0.27) 0.677 (1.39) 
Finland 0.0241 (0.89) -1.290 (-1.36) -0.551 (-0.78) 
France -0.00973 (-0.38) -0.0887 (-0.11) 1.266* (2.01) 
Germany 0.0518* (2.22) 1.633* (2.03) 0.498 (0.67) 
Greece -0.00888 (-0.43) -0.0382 (-0.05) 1.221* (1.98) 
Hungary 0.0485 (1.54) -0.783 (-0.71) -0.0970 (-0.15) 
Ireland -0.0180 (-0.69) -1.908* (-2.23) 1.096 (1.85) 
Israel -0.0577** (-2.66) -1.341 (-1.76) 
  Italy 0.0559 (0.68) 1.240 (0.49) 0.850 (0.46) 
Latvia 0.0200 (0.89) -0.358 (-0.46) 0.199 (0.26) 
Lithuania -0.00616 (-0.25) -0.173 (-0.21) 1.040* (2.17) 
Malta -0.0213 (-0.94) -1.267 (-1.68) -0.360 (-0.89) 
Netherlands 0.0166 (0.71) 0.764 (0.98) -0.617 (-1.25) 
Norway 0.0131 (0.58) 0.440 (0.57) 0.622 (1.02) 
Poland 0.0702** (2.95) 0.495 (0.65) 0.747 (1.85) 
Portugal 0.0173 (0.69) -0.817 (-0.97) -0.134 (-0.21) 
Romania 0.00143 (0.06) 0.155 (0.18) 1.856* (2.44) 
Russia -0.00523 (-0.21) -1.614 (-1.84) 1.728* (2.45) 
Serbia -0.0134 (-0.42) -2.165 (-1.95) 2.286* (2.44) 
Slovakia 0.0104 (0.20) -2.209 (-1.26) 0.320 (0.37) 
Slovenia 0.0258 (1.23) 0.450 (0.65) -0.315 (-0.71) 
Spain 0.0555* (2.24) -1.439 (-1.77) -0.696 (-0.98) 
Sweden 0.0152 (0.72) 1.276 (1.68) 1.113 (1.86) 
Switzerland 0.0339 (1.28) 0.587 (0.65) 0.352 (0.54) 
Turkey -0.0458* (-1.97) 1.320 (1.66) 
  United Kingdom 0.0315 (1.36) -1.301 (-1.65) 0.00888 (0.02) 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 14: Country-Specific linear voting model, Eurovision Song Contest including 
cultural dimensions, continued 4 
 
PDI 
 
IDV 
 
MAS 
 
UAI 
 
cons 
 
N 
Austria -0.00386 (-0.37) 0.0534 (1.83) -0.0258* (-2.12) -0.0435* (-2.11) 3.565* (2.24) 187 
Belgium 
-
0.0754*** (-4.60) 0.0151 (0.91) 0.00442 (0.30) 0.0652*** (4.27) -4.005* (-2.59) 278 
Bulgaria -0.0282 (-1.37) -0.0100 (-0.39) 0.0345 (1.19) 0.00672 (0.33) -1.132 (-0.86) 160 
Croatia -0.00899 (-0.68) -0.0152 (-0.98) 0.00705 (0.33) 0.00126 (0.09) -0.415 (-0.52) 296 
Czech Re-
public 0.0326 (1.19) 0.0221 (0.60) -0.0141 (-0.56) 0.0567* (2.09) -4.471* (-2.11) 53 
Denmark 0.0159 (0.96) -0.0645*** (-3.48) -0.0337** (-2.62) -0.0329* (-2.36) 1.035 (1.03) 250 
Estonia -0.0409** (-2.73) -0.0620*** (-3.76) -0.0150 (-1.23) 0.0146 (1.00) 2.564** (3.05) 297 
Finland -0.0250 (-1.31) -0.0282 (-1.16) -0.0164 (-1.08) -0.0288 (-1.35) 3.842*** (3.34) 235 
France -0.00494 (-0.30) 0.0348 (1.61) -0.0369 (-1.63) 0.0355 (1.90) -2.902 (-1.49) 291 
Germany -0.00820 (-0.51) 0.0527* (2.46) -0.0330* (-2.16) -0.0107 (-0.59) -0.829 (-0.90) 291 
Greece -0.0285 (-1.56) 0.00974 (0.56) -0.0257* (-2.16) 0.00232 (0.16) 0.940 (1.37) 252 
Hungary 0.00886 (0.34) 0.0281 (1.22) 0.00277 (0.20) 0.0280 (1.59) -0.0380 (-0.02) 144 
Ireland 0.0199 (1.14) -0.0854*** (-3.45) 0.0508*** (3.38) 0.00467 (0.22) -2.113 (-1.44) 274 
Israel 0.0521*** (4.32) -0.0377 (-1.79) 0.00387 (0.21) 0.0379* (2.47) -3.102** (-2.98) 282 
Italy 0.0433 (0.75) 0.0133 (0.23) -0.0125 (-0.35) -0.0346 (-0.78) 0.277 (0.07) 53 
Latvia 0.0110 (0.56) -0.0806*** (-5.02) 0.000882 (0.08) 0.0000341 (0.00) 0.441 (0.32) 256 
Lithuania -0.0380* (-2.04) -0.0130 (-0.58) -0.0277* (-2.23) -0.0157 (-0.84) 1.010 (1.27) 232 
Malta -0.0183 (-1.12) 0.0199 (1.02) 0.0159 (0.78) 0.0254* (1.98) -0.137 (-0.13) 295 
Netherlands -0.0463** (-2.68) 0.0301 (1.68) 0.0123 (1.13) -0.00938 (-0.57) 0.0772 (0.10) 279 
Norway 0.0205 (1.21) -0.0392* (-2.10) -0.0203* (-2.06) -0.00563 (-0.32) 0.296 (0.31) 273 
Poland 0.0288 (1.78) -0.0359 (-1.90) 0.00511 (0.42) -0.00635 (-0.53) -0.179 (-0.17) 222 
Portugal 0.0666*** (3.64) 0.0143 (0.85) 0.00345 (0.20) -0.0249 (-1.70) 0.965 (0.58) 239 
Romania 0.0149 (0.99) -0.0247 (-1.28) -0.0200 (-0.91) 0.00390 (0.23) 0.937 (1.01) 252 
Russia 0.0269 (1.59) 0.0608** (2.64) -0.0459 (-1.92) -0.0389* (-2.51) -0.838 (-0.74) 250 
Serbia 0.00920 (0.40) 0.000155 (0.01) 0.0422 (1.26) -0.0332 (-1.38) -0.147 (-0.10) 119 
Slovakia 0.0253 (1.09) -0.0303 (-0.65) 0.0114 (0.53) -0.0120 (-0.36) -1.442 (-0.46) 92 
Slovenia 0.0200 (1.47) -0.0106 (-0.69) -0.0300** (-2.64) 0.0170 (1.36) 2.443** (3.01) 279 
Spain 0.0538** (3.24) 0.0143 (0.47) 0.0237 (1.27) -0.0320* (-2.14) 1.330 (0.63) 291 
Sweden 0.0117 (0.70) -0.00805 (-0.47) -0.00519 (-0.56) -0.0152 (-1.29) -0.125 (-0.13) 292 
Switzerland -0.0410* (-2.29) 0.0888*** (3.39) -0.0177 (-1.24) -0.0179 (-0.96) 1.614 (0.99) 238 
Turkey 0.0138 (0.83) -0.00531 (-0.30) -0.00656 (-0.38) -0.0234 (-1.26) -1.170 (-1.20) 274 
United King-
dom 
-
0.0589*** (-3.59) -0.00779 (-0.44) 0.00875 (0.69) 0.0326 (1.87) -1.600 (-1.47) 291 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 15: Linear Voting Model, Bundesvision Song Contest  
 (1) (2) 
 Model Model 
NeighbAB 0.563*** 0.609*** 
 (3.55) (3.84) 
   
Length_CBAB 0.000108 0.0000931 
 (0.23) (0.19) 
   
Capital_DisAB -0.00208*** -0.00203*** 
 (-6.44) (-6.28) 
   
FormerGDRB -0.134 -0.0872 
 (-1.66) (-1.06) 
   
Home_BiasAB 7.925*** 8.093*** 
 (42.88) (37.78) 
   
Male_soloBt -0.0344 -0.0505 
 (-0.24) (-0.35) 
   
DuetBt -0.0436 -0.0596 
 (-0.47) (-0.64) 
   
GroupBt -0.00126 -0.00768 
 (-0.01) (-0.06) 
   
OrderBt -0.000864 -0.00172 
 (-0.11) (-0.22) 
   
HostBt -0.0151 -0.0706 
 (-0.10) (-0.46) 
   
ReligionAB 0.192* 0.123 
 (2.12) (1.35) 
   
OpennessAB  0.209 
  (0.64) 
   
AgreeablenessAB  -1.910** 
  (-3.20) 
   
ExtraversionAB  1.446* 
  (2.19) 
   
NeuroticismAB  -1.138*** 
  (-3.32) 
   
ConscientiousnessAB  1.913*** 
  (4.15) 
   
_cons 0.0194 -0.0739 
 (0.09) (-0.32) 
N 2304 2304 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 16: Country-Specific linear voting model, Bundesvision Song Contest, 1 
CountryA Neighb  Length_CB  Capital_Dis  
Brandenburg 1.405 (0.81) -0.00554 (-1.14) -0.00283 (-1.81) 
Berlin   0.00569 (1.88) -0.000116 (-0.07) 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.0974 (0.16) 0.00115 (1.22) -0.00188 (-1.23) 
Bavaria 0.146 (0.30) 0.00199* (2.50) 0.000230 (0.15) 
Bremen   0.00730 (1.35) -0.00305* (-2.29) 
Hesse 1.218 (0.99) -0.00301 (-0.60) -0.00117 (-0.79) 
Hamburg -3.478* (-2.29) 0.0469** (3.22) -0.00469*** (-3.94) 
Mecklenbur-Western 
Pomerania 
0.365 (0.50) 0.00105 (0.40) -0.000759 (-0.66) 
Lower Saxony -1.624** (-2.95) 0.00291* (2.38) -0.00800*** (-4.06) 
North Rhine-
Westphalia 
-0.147 (-0.17) -0.0000691 (-0.03) 0.00185 (1.17) 
Rhineland-Palatinate 3.120** (3.24) -0.00467 (-1.44) -0.000472 (-0.27) 
Saxony-Anhalt -3.364* (-2.03) 0.00896 (1.71) -0.00144 (-0.59) 
Schleswig-Holstein 2.338 (0.49) -0.0142 (-0.38) -0.00483*** (-4.25) 
Saarland   0.00955** (2.74) -0.00120 (-0.90) 
Saxony -0.216 (-0.27) -0.00364 (-0.81) -0.00572* (-2.04) 
Thuringia -0.250 (-0.24) 0.00215 (0.68) -0.000993 (-0.28) 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 17: Country-Specific linear voting model, Bundesvision Song Contest, continued 
2 
CountryA FormerGDR  Home_Bias  
Branden-burg 0.00905 (0.01) 6.666*** (8.00) 
Berlin 1.185 (1.68) 4.900*** (5.06) 
Baden-Wuerttemberg -0.446 (-1.31) 8.012*** (10.67) 
Bavaria 0.0657 (0.25) 11.22*** (14.83) 
Bremen -1.054** (-2.85) 9.145*** (11.77) 
Hesse -0.277 (-0.78) 9.154*** (10.40) 
Hamburg 1.339 (1.85) 8.805*** (9.44) 
Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania 
0.0192 (0.04) 10.39*** (17.70) 
Lower Saxony -1.094** (-2.99) 2.102* (2.18) 
North Rhine-
Westphalia 
-1.328*** (-4.05) 7.302*** (9.51) 
Rhineland-Palatinate -0.454 (-1.37) 11.10*** (11.57) 
Saxony-Anhalt 2.453*** (3.47) 6.986*** (7.51) 
Schleswig-Holstein -1.862*** (-5.12) 6.558*** (8.77) 
Saarland -0.286 (-0.75) 10.12*** (13.05) 
Saxony 2.256** (2.96) 4.036*** (3.59) 
Thuringia 1.391* (2.51) 8.053*** (7.70) 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 18: Country-Specific linear voting model, Bundesvision Song Contest, continued 
3 
 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 19: Country-Specific linear voting model, Bundesvision Song Contest, continued 
4 
CountryA Host  Religion  _cons  N 
Brandenburg 1.045 (1.80) 0.835 (1.38) 0.188 (0.21) 144 
Berlin 0.761 (1.18) 0.334 (0.47) -1.063 (-1.09) 144 
Baden-
Wuerttemberg 
0.00217 (0.00) -0.479 (-1.02) 0.692 (0.71) 144 
Bavaria -0.0948 (-0.22) 0.149 (0.38) -1.461 (-1.45) 144 
Bremen -1.387* (-2.26) -0.464 (-0.95) 1.955* (2.38) 144 
Hesse -0.329 (-0.59) -0.651 (-1.56) -0.676 (-0.91) 144 
Hamburg -0.336 (-0.50) -2.157** (-3.02) 0.530 (0.68) 144 
Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania 
0.690 (1.46) 0.525 (1.00) -1.259 (-1.89) 144 
Lower Saxony -0.445 (-0.80) 1.651*** (3.55) 2.257* (2.42) 144 
North Rhine-
Westphalia 
0.930 (1.82) -0.716* (-2.21) -0.829 (-1.05) 144 
Rhineland-
Palatinate 
-0.654 (-1.18) -0.412 (-0.99) -1.123 (-1.25) 144 
Saxony-Anhalt 0.513 (0.76) -0.685 (-1.00) -0.953 (-0.89) 144 
Schleswig-Holstein -0.502 (-0.91) -1.379** (-3.26) 2.234** (2.69) 144 
Saarland -0.199 (-0.31) 0.300 (0.61) -0.198 (-0.23) 144 
Saxony 0.268 (0.39) -0.959 (-1.44) 1.834 (1.29) 144 
Thuringia 0.840 (1.41) -0.635 (-1.30) -0.798 (-0.65) 144 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
CountryA Male_solo  Duet  Group  Order  
Brandenburg -0.969 (-1.72) -0.347 (-1.00) 0.138 (0.27) 0.00970 (0.32) 
Berlin -0.155 (-0.26) -0.441 (-1.17) 0.0223 (0.04) 0.0334 (1.00) 
Baden-
Wuerttemberg 
0.375 (0.73) 0.135 (0.41) -0.470 (-0.97) -0.0166 (-0.57) 
Bavaria 0.445 (1.11) 0.117 (0.45) 0.0277 (0.07) 0.0257 (1.14) 
Bremen -1.464* (-2.46) 0.362 (0.97) -1.393* (-2.50) -
0.000312 
(-0.01) 
Hesse 0.341 (0.64) 0.292 (0.84) 0.211 (0.42) 0.0251 (0.84) 
Hamburg 0.965 (1.54) -0.210 (-0.54) 0.552 (0.95) 0.0154 (0.45) 
Mecklenburg-
Western Pom-
erania 
0.169 (0.37) -0.520 (-1.83) 0.448 (1.05) 0.0288 (1.16) 
Lower Saxony 0.241 (0.45) -0.0537 (-0.16) -0.191 (-0.39) 0.00928 (0.32) 
North Rhine-
Westphalia 
0.261 (0.55) 0.111 (0.36) 0.231 (0.51) 0.0176 (0.66) 
Rhineland-
Palatinate 
0.588 (1.14) 0.332 (1.00) 0.163 (0.33) 0.00140 (0.05) 
Saxony-Anhalt -0.206 (-0.31) 0.162 (0.40) 0.309 (0.51) 0.0363 (1.02) 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
0.0584 (0.11) 0.411 (1.22) -0.527 (-1.06) 0.0157 (0.54) 
Saarland 0.00624 (0.01) 0.213 (0.54) 0.319 (0.56) -0.0423 (-1.26) 
Saxony -0.793 (-1.22) 0.0206 (0.05) 0.180 (0.30) -0.0303 (-0.84) 
Thuringia 0.580 (1.00) -0.404 (-1.12) 0.893 (1.67) -0.0486 (-1.56) 
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Table 20: Country-Specific linear voting model, Bundesvision Song Contest, including 
Big 5, 1 
CountryA Neighb  Length_CB  Capital_Dis  
Brandenburg -0.169 (-0.08) -0.00196 (-0.35) -0.00219 (-0.85) 
Berlin   0.00622 (1.75) -0.0000139 (-0.01) 
Baden-Wuerttemberg -0.387 (-0.47) 0.00107 (1.08) -0.00335 (-0.80) 
Bavaria 0.391 (0.74) 0.00232* (2.23) 0.00240 (0.97) 
Bremen   0.0126* (2.08) -0.00267 (-1.37) 
Hesse 1.265 (0.84) -0.00162 (-0.29) -0.000583 (-0.35) 
Hamburg -2.208 (-1.10) 0.0355 (1.69) -0.00459* (-2.49) 
Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania 
0.312 (0.37) 0.00147 (0.51) 0.00128 (0.58) 
Lower Saxony 3.286*** (-4.79) 0.00469** (3.20) -0.00720** (-3.30) 
North Rhine-Westphalia -0.120 (-0.09) -0.00160 (-0.69) -0.000574 (-0.27) 
Rhineland-Palatinate 3.413* (1.99) -0.00600 (-1.02) 0.000626 (0.28) 
Saxony-Anhalt -2.023 (-1.09) 0.00139 (0.23) -0.00708* (-2.21) 
Schleswig-Holstein 0.528 (0.09) -0.00220 (-0.05) -0.00477* (-2.14) 
Saarland   0.0102* (2.45) -0.00145 (-0.60) 
Saxony -0.613 (-0.81) -0.00825 (-1.66) -0.00785* (-2.28) 
Thuringia -0.528 (-0.39) 0.00119 (0.32) 0.000170 (0.04) 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 21: Country-Specific linear voting model, Bundesvision Song Contest, including 
Big 5, continued 2 
CountryA FormerGDR  Home_Bias  
Branden-burg 0.154 (0.07) 6.141*** (5.66) 
Berlin 1.362 (1.26) 5.234*** (3.89) 
Baden-Wuerttemberg -1.030 (-1.96) 7.458*** (6.13) 
Bavaria 0.250 (0.73) 12.16*** (11.24) 
Bremen -2.495* (-2.12) 10.33*** (7.53) 
Hesse 0.344 (0.64) 9.956*** (5.98) 
Hamburg 0.774 (0.54) 9.299*** (6.84) 
Mecklenburg-Western Po-
merania 
-0.698 (-0.88) 9.772*** (12.85) 
Lower Saxony -0.956* (-2.59) 1.569 (1.02) 
North Rhine-Westphalia -1.338* (-2.44) 6.616*** (4.50) 
Rhineland-Palatinate -0.670 (-1.33) 11.19*** (10.38) 
Saxony-Anhalt 0.609 (0.47) 3.948** (3.16) 
Schleswig-Holstein -0.00625 (-0.01) 2.270 (1.22) 
Saarland -0.119 (-0.14) 10.21*** (7.55) 
Saxony -0.633 (-0.63) 1.142 (0.81) 
Thuringia 3.577* (2.10) 6.928*** (4.71) 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 22: Country-Specific linear voting model, Bundesvision Song Contest, including  
Big 5, continued 3 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 23: Country-Specific linear voting model, Bundesvision Song Contest, including  
Big 5, continued 4 
CountryA Host  Religion  Openness  Agreeabl  
Brandenburg 0.814 (1.36) 0.733 (0.54) 3.184 (0.66) -0.0954 (-0.01) 
Berlin 0.827 (1.25) 0.358 (0.37) 0.463 (0.13) 2.610 (0.36) 
Baden-
Wuerttemberg -0.126 (-0.22) -1.376 (-1.87) -0.735 (-0.14) -3.107 (-0.79) 
Bavaria -0.346 (-0.80) 0.135 (0.34) 2.218 (1.11) -5.081* (-2.22) 
Bremen -1.370* (-2.16) -1.596 (-1.72) 3.121 (1.53) -14.53 (-1.82) 
Hesse -0.397 (-0.69) -0.574 (-1.04) 5.118 (1.45) -5.491 (-1.25) 
Hamburg -0.298 (-0.44) -1.647 (-1.52) 1.846 (0.67) 4.263 (0.92) 
Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania 0.663 (1.37) 1.176 (1.20) -0.786 (-0.35) -1.161 (-0.31) 
Lower Saxony -0.329 (-0.65) 1.747*** (3.67) -9.128** (-2.75) -1.140 (-0.29) 
North Rhine-
Westphalia 0.775 (1.49) -1.193* (-2.41) -0.0310 (-0.01) -8.782 (-1.95) 
Rhineland-
Palatinate -0.900 (-1.59) -1.069 (-1.62) -0.574 (-0.15) -5.033 (-1.19) 
Saxony-Anhalt 0.298 (0.45) 0.187 (0.17) -7.088 (-1.71) -1.658 (-0.43) 
Schleswig-Holstein -0.128 (-0.23) -0.455 (-0.88) -4.643* (-2.14) -5.875 (-1.61) 
Saarland -0.278 (-0.41) 0.339 (0.53) 0.648 (0.16) -1.266 (-0.34) 
Saxony 0.355 (0.55) 2.447* (2.51) -6.234** (-3.01) 14.61** (2.77) 
Thuringia 0.647 (1.05) -1.171 (-1.20) 5.912 (1.45) -5.173 (-1.33) 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
CountryA Male_solo  Duet  Group  Order  
Brandenburg -1.128 (-1.97) -0.463 (-1.30) -0.00108 (-0.00) 0.00961 (0.31) 
Berlin -0.0785 (-0.13) -0.428 (-1.09) 0.120 (0.21) 0.0276 (0.79) 
Baden-
Wuerttemberg 0.438 (0.82) 0.146 (0.44) -0.565 (-1.14) -0.0182 (-0.61) 
Bavaria 0.226 (0.55) 0.138 (0.53) -0.157 (-0.40) 0.0163 (0.70) 
Bremen -1.675** (-2.75) 0.296 (0.79) -1.447* (-2.59) 0.00306 (0.09) 
Hesse 0.323 (0.58) 0.305 (0.87) 0.136 (0.26) 0.0123 (0.40) 
Hamburg 0.908 (1.42) -0.139 (-0.34) 0.477 (0.80) 0.0209 (0.58) 
Mecklenburg-
Western Po-
merania 0.0732 (0.16) -0.504 (-1.73) 0.373 (0.87) 0.0443 (1.70) 
Lower Saxony 0.536 (1.12) 0.0182 (0.06) 0.233 (0.52) 0.000202 (0.01) 
North Rhine-
Westphalia 0.246 (0.50) 0.145 (0.47) 0.199 (0.43) 0.0176 (0.66) 
Rhineland-
Palatinate 0.541 (1.04) 0.253 (0.76) 0.0864 (0.18) -0.00632 (-0.21) 
Saxony-Anhalt -0.345 (-0.54) -0.0291 (-0.07) 0.230 (0.39) 0.0611 (1.76) 
Schleswig-
Holstein 0.246 (0.47) 0.440 (1.35) -0.408 (-0.85) 0.0181 (0.62) 
Saarland -0.0903 (-0.14) 0.195 (0.49) 0.280 (0.48) -0.0451 (-1.29) 
Saxony -0.977 (-1.59) 0.293 (0.75) -0.214 (-0.38) -0.0144 (-0.42) 
Thuringia 0.587 (0.99) -0.355 (-0.98) 0.806 (1.49) -0.0662* (-2.02) 
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Table 24: Country-Specific linear voting model, Bundesvision Song Contest, including  
Big 5, continued 5 
CountryA Extrav.  Neurot.  Conscie.  _cons N 
Brandenburg -4.433 (-0.84) -3.402 (-1.64) -0.995 (-0.21) 0.838 (0.47) 144 
Berlin 2.373 (0.48) -1.595 (-0.50) -0.481 (-0.18) -1.458 (-0.92) 144 
Baden-
Wuerttemberg 
-2.601 (-0.50) -2.633 (-0.52) 3.768 (1.12) 2.238 (1.49) 144 
Bavaria 0.972 (0.48) -1.760 (-0.94) 0.215 (0.07) -2.148 (-1.71) 144 
Bremen 1.511 (0.49) 12.495 (1.58) 7.901* (2.30) 1.965 (1.65) 144 
Hesse 6.236 (1.21) -0.601 (-0.27) -2.760 (-0.74) -1.418 (-1.00) 144 
Hamburg -3.591 (-0.83) -1.044 (-0.20) 2.424 (0.71) -0.459 (-0.25) 144 
Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania 
-6.589* (-1.99) 1.961 (0.85) -3.960 (-1.40) -0.603 (-0.72) 144 
Lower Saxony 13.68*** (3.57) 4.931 (1.77) 2.481 (0.86) 2.361 (1.70) 144 
North Rhine-
Westphalia 
5.765 (0.83) -2.460 (-1.12) 2.626 (0.64) 0.383 (0.21) 144 
Rhineland-
Palatinate 
3.152 (0.73) -5.086 (-1.39) 0.0385 (0.01) -0.399 (-0.38) 144 
Saxony-Anhalt -3.773 (-0.96) -2.026 (-0.99) -7.165 (-1.86) 3.207* (2.01) 144 
Schleswig-Holstein 5.411 (1.68) -11.57** (-3.14) 4.677* (2.23) 5.465** (3.25) 144 
Saarland -0.0613 (-0.01) 0.495 (0.14) 1.180 (0.38) -0.260 (-0.21) 144 
Saxony -8.876 (-1.69) -0.693 (-0.38) -13.71*** (-3.38) 4.694** (2.93) 144 
Thuringia 4.894 (1.24) 2.480 (0.87) -10.03 (-1.07) -1.136 (-0.86) 144 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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